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Uncoupling 
Naomi Cahn and June Carbone* 
ABSTRACT 
A series of Supreme Court decisions recognize the end of the federal–
state–corporate partnership that once provided a foundation for employment 
security and family stability. That partnership, which reached its pinnacle 
during the industrial era, established a family wage made available to the 
majority of the male population through unionization, a social safety net that 
filled the gaps left by wage labor, and the extension of these public and 
private benefits to women and children through marriage. 
Uncoupling shows how family security and stability can no longer be 
linked to employment or marriage, requiring a redesign of the state response. 
The Supreme Court has framed the necessary elements in that response. 
First, although other scholars note that the Court’s marriage equality 
decision in Obergefell celebrates marriage, this Article emphasizes that the 
decision rejects the historical conception of marriage that made it 
mandatory, gendered, and foundational to family security. Second, the 
Court’s opinion in Little Sisters of the Poor in 2020 reaffirms the Court’s 
earlier decisions that employers owe no civic obligations to their employees 
or the public good and are thus inappropriate partners for the administration 
of state benefits. Third, the Court’s ongoing decisions interpreting the 
Affordable Care Act, including those pending during the upcoming Supreme 
Court term, lend more support to direct state–citizen compacts than to 
employment-based benefits. 
What other legal scholars have yet to acknowledge is that these decisions 
point the way toward the emergence of a new legal order. This Article’s 
groundbreaking analysis of the rise and fall of the male family wage leads to 
the conclusion that coupling—between men and women in marriage and 
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between employers and state-sponsored benefits—no longer works, clearing 
the way for the creation of a new legal order. 
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  INTRODUCTION 
Cesar Ardon lives in Siloam Springs, a small town of about 17,000 people 
in Arkansas, close to the Oklahoma border.1 Mr. Ardon, who is forty years 
old, worked as a welder for fifteen years.2 Then doctors discovered a 
baseball-sized tumor on his ribs.3 Since the surgery to remove it in May 2017, 
he has found occasional work as a handyman, but his pay and the hours he 
works fluctuate each week with the number of jobs he can find.4 Through 
Medicaid, he was able to get treatment and care.5 But then, in March 2018, 
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) granted the State of 
Arkansas a waiver from Medicaid requirements imposed under the 
Affordable Care Act (ACA).6 Under the AR Works Amendment, the state 
could require Medicaid recipients to comply with work requirements in order 
to continue receiving benefits.7 
In May 2018, the state notified Mr. Ardon that he was required to work at 
least eighty hours a month if he wanted to keep his Medicaid coverage.8 Not 
only does Mr. Ardon have trouble securing eighty hours of work each month, 
but he also has difficulty reporting the work he does through the Medicaid 
website.9 Yet, if he were to lose his Medicaid coverage, perhaps only because 
 
 1. This description is based on the filings and opinions in Gresham v. Azar, 950 F.3d 93 
(D.C. Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Arkansas v. Gresham, No. 20-38, 2020 WL 7086047 (U.S. 
Dec. 4, 2020); see SPLC Sues Trump Administration for Approving Arkansas Medicaid Work 
Requirement, S. POVERTY L. CTR. (Aug. 14, 2018), 
https://www.splcenter.org/news/2018/08/14/splc-sues-trump-administration-approving-
arkansas-medicaid-work-requirement [https://perma.cc/6RWB-UAT7]. The case had been set for 
argument on March 29, 2021, but earlier that month, the Supreme Court removed the case from 
its docket. Search Results: No. 20-37, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S., 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/20-
37.html [https://perma.cc/Q4Z3-G2AU]; see James Romoser, Court Nixes Upcoming Argument 
on Medicaid Work Requirements, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 11, 2021, 12:55 PM), 
https://www.scotusblog.com/2021/03/court-nixes-upcoming-argument-on-medicaid-work-
requirements/ [https://perma.cc/F5H5-Y3NP]. 
 2. S. POVERTY L. CTR., supra note 1. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. “Medicaid establishes certain minimum coverage requirements that states must include 
in their plans. States can deviate from those requirements if the Secretary [of Health and Human 
Services] waives them so that the state can engage in ‘experimental, pilot, or demonstration 
project[s].’” Gresham v. Azar, 950 F.3d 93, 96 (D.C. Cir.) (first citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a; and 
then citing 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a)) (describing statutory framework), cert. granted sub nom. 
Arkansas v. Gresham, No. 20-38, 2020 WL 7086047 (U.S. Dec. 4, 2020). 
 8. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at paras. 144, 147, Gresham v. Azar, 
363 F. Supp. 3d 165 (D.D.C. 2019) (No. 1:18-cv-01900). 
 9. Id. 
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of a reporting glitch, he would have trouble paying for the health care he 
needs to stay alive.10 
Five months after he received the notice, he became a plaintiff in a lawsuit, 
claiming that the AR Work Amendment violates both the Constitution and 
the Administrative Procedure Act.11 The question of whether the ACA 
permits work requirements, as expressed through Cesar Ardon’s challenge, 
characterizes the clash between legal regimes that provide individuals 
stability and security.12 His story shows what happens when an old regime 
begins to falter, but the terms of the new order have not yet come into place. 
We are at such a moment today, and we believe that the story of the 
ongoing litigation underlying the ACA can be told in such terms. While 
others have addressed how the ACA has transformed the country’s approach 
to health care,13 this Article shows that the ACA litigation goes far beyond a 
story about health insurance. Instead, this Article is the first to bring together 
the ACA litigation with other Supreme Court decisions to show not just the 
collapse of the regime providing family security and stability but also the 
nascent development of a new one.14 
The old regime, which arose to meet the needs of the industrial era, rested 
on three pillars: secure, long-term employment paying a male “family wage”; 
the extension of these benefits to women and children through marriage; and 
the design of social insurance to fill in the gaps left by the first two.15 A series 
of Supreme Court decisions has recognized and in some cases has accelerated 
the end of the federal–state–corporate partnership that once provided the 
elements of that system and a foundation for family security.16 Large 
corporations no longer provide secure employment or comprehensive 
 
 10. S. POVERTY L. CTR., supra note 1. 
 11. Gresham, 950 F.3d at 96. 
 12. As this article was finalized in early March 2021, it appeared that the Biden 
administration would repeal the waivers at issue in Gresham. Romoser, supra note 1. Regardless 
of the ultimate outcome of work requirements, the issues at the core of the case show the 
disintegration of the old regime for providing family security and stability. 
 13. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck & Thomas Scott-Railton, Affordable Care Act Entrenchment, 
108 GEO. L.J. 495 (2020) (describing ACA litigation); Andrew Hammond, Litigating Welfare 
Rights: Medicaid, SNAP, and the Legacy of the New Property, 115 NW. U. L. REV. 361 (2020). 
 14. Other scholars discuss the changes in employment, see infra Part II, and marriage, see 
infra Parts II.A and B, but not the implications of these changes for redesign of the state of both 
sets of changes for a new state order. 
 15. See discussion infra Part I. 
 16. These decisions, of which Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v. 
Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367 (2020), is simply a recent iteration, recharacterize the role of 
corporations, unions, and citizens in the constitutional order. See infra Part III. 
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benefits for a large portion of the population.17 Marriage is no longer the 
compulsory institution for childrearing, with just under 40% of American 
children born outside of marriage.18 And a social safety net premised on 
marriage and employment can no longer meet families’ needs.19 
Within this context, the provision of health care became a flash point.20 
The old system assumed that employers would provide health insurance 
covering most employees, and that only supplementary services for the 
elderly (Medicare), the poor (Medicaid), or dependent women and children 
required government involvement.21 By the time President Obama proposed 
the ACA, however, very few of the assumptions on which this system was 
based remained true. Employees, even if they have secure jobs, switch jobs 
more frequently than they once did.22 And more workers cycle in and out of 
the labor market.23 While married couples have two adults who might be able 
to secure employer-provided family health coverage, unmarried parents may 
have only one adult who can do so, contributing to the overall decline in 
employer-sponsored health care coverage.24 And Medicare and Medicaid, at 
least as originally conceived, did not cover these gaps.25 
The federal government’s attempt to address these changes produced the 
ACA. The question of what the ACA stands for, however, is far from fixed. 
 
 17. See GERALD F. DAVIS, THE VANISHING AMERICAN CORPORATION: NAVIGATING THE 
HAZARDS OF A NEW ECONOMY 122–24 (2016) (describing decline in the number of employees at 
large corporations and the greater transience in the labor market more generally); id. at ix–xii 
(describing change in the organization of work from “careers to jobs to tasks” (emphasis 
omitted)). 
 18. Unmarried Childbearing, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STAT., 
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/unmarried-childbearing.htm [https://perma.cc/3BJ4-VK5V] 
(Dec. 9, 2019). 
 19. See discussion infra Part I.A. 
 20. See generally Gluck & Scott-Railton, supra note 13 (describing history of and reaction 
to the ACA). 
 21. See discussion infra Part III.C. Consider the importance of covering pre-existing 
conditions. Elizabeth A. Pendo, The Health Care Choice Act: The Individual Insurance Market 
and the Politics of “Choice,” 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 473, 479 (2007). 
 22. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 23. See Nick Bunker, What’s Behind the Decline in Male Labor Force Participation in the 
United States?, WASH. CTR. FOR EQUITABLE GROWTH (June 22, 2016), 
https://equitablegrowth.org/whats-behind-the-decline-in-male-labor-force-participation-in-the-
united-states/ [https://perma.cc/34E9-D559] (maintaining that the decline in labor market 
participation reflects in part more time spent between jobs). 
 24. See, e.g., Matthew Rae, Daniel McDermott, Larry Levitt & Gary Claxton, Long-Term 
Trends in Employer-Based Coverage, PETERSON-KFF (Apr. 3, 2020), 
https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/brief/long-term-trends-in-employer-based-coverage/ 
[https://perma.cc/QCG5-DSUM]. 
 25. Indeed, the original ACA recognized this gap by mandating Medicaid expansion to 
cover those with incomes up to 138% of the poverty line. Gluck & Scott-Railton, supra note 13, 
at 545. 
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The ACA can be seen as a band-aid, covering the gaps left by a system that 
relies principally on employer-provided (and tax-subsidized) private 
insurance.26 Medicaid expansion, in turn, can be characterized as a federal–
state partnership in which administration of such programs is best 
decentralized.27 The ACA, however, can also be characterized as something 
else altogether—the first step in a new social compact that remakes the 
relationship between citizen and state in fundamental ways. 
This Article positions the ongoing litigation over the ACA, ranging from 
the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Gresham to the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Little Sisters of the Poor, within the context of the changing terms of family 
security and stability. Our argument is that the economy of the information 
age has dismantled the industrial-era system that tethered family security to 
the male family wage, long-term employment, and stable marriage, 
disguising the state role in securing family well-being.28 The new system 
decouples the relationship between employment and family security, 
marriage, and women’s intrinsic dependence.29 In the process, it undermines 
the premises of New Deal era social insurance in which benefits were tethered 
to marriage and long-term employment.30 The fights over the ACA provide 
signposts defining what the terms of the new regime are likely to be.31 
 
 26. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 683–85 (2014) (recognizing 
corporations as no more than instruments to advance the interests of their owners). 
 27. Gluck & Scott-Railton, supra note 13, at 498. 
 28. Orly Lobel has powerfully argued that “there is no natural exclusive link between social 
welfare and employment.” Orly Lobel, The Gig Economy & the Future of Employment and Labor 
Law, 51 U.S.F. L. REV. 51, 69 (2017). 
 29. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 30. See discussion infra Part I.C. 
 31. The ACA remains under challenge. See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 949 F.3d 182 (5th 
Cir.) (alleging that now that the individual mandate has been eliminated, it can no longer be 
justified by the taxing power), cert. granted sub nom. California v. Texas, 140 S. Ct. 1262 (Mar. 
2, 2020) (No. 19-840), and cert. granted sub nom. Texas v. California, 140 S. Ct. 1262 (Mar. 2, 
2020) (No. 19-1019). The national political discussion, however, has already shifted to the need 
to provide universal health care. A new plan, designed to overcome the obstacles the Supreme 
Court put in the path of the ACA, is likely to be more firmly tied to the principle of uniform 
national coverage than the ACA itself. Indeed, the easiest way to extend universal health care is 
through Medicare for all, in part because new legislation could simply build on the existing 
Medicare structure, a long-standing arrangement whose constitutionality is firmly established. 
See, e.g., Miles Mogulescu, Conservatives and Liberals Agree: Medicare for All Would Be 
Constitutional, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 3, 2012), https://pnhp.org/news/conservatives-and-
liberals-agree-medicare-for-all-would-be-constitutional/ [https://perma.cc/EE2P-E4S5]. While 
the Biden–Harris platform calls, instead, for a public option, that option may over time ultimately 
lead to the further erosion of employer-provided health care, ultimately severing the link between 
health care and employment altogether. See, e.g., Susannah Luthi, Why Employers Are Flirting 
with the Public Option, POLITICO (Feb. 10, 2020, 12:55 PM), 
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This Article considers the interrelationship between marriage, work, and 
economic benefits. It introduces the terms “decoupling” to describe the 
changes that make tying family security to marriage and employment 
ineffective and “uncoupling” to describe the redesign of a system that no 
longer makes marriage or long-term employment conditions for access to 
individual security and autonomy. In other words, “decoupling” is the 
dismantling of the older system, and “uncoupling” is the design of benefits 
that do not depend on either marriage or employment.32 
Part I sets up “coupling,” the normative framework for the state–corporate 
partnership that provided family stability and individual security. It describes 
the development of the family wage, explaining how this reinforced female 
dependency. It then turns to the origins of the state-based social insurance 
system, in which benefits were tied to ability to work and familial 
connections to the worker. Part II shows how economic changes have 
decoupled family security and stability from marriage and employment. Part 
III explores how the system that secures family stability can be uncoupled 
not just from marriage but also from long-term employment—and from the 
assumptions that arose from the male family wage of the industrial era. This 
then means changing the relationship between the individual and the state.33 
I. COUPLING: THE RISE OF THE FAMILY WAGE 
To understand the insecurity underlying today’s family requires 
examining the corporate–state partnership that provided economic stability 
for much of the twentieth century. That system depended on the forces 
producing a male family wage, a gendered division of family labor, and a 
social insurance system tied to the notions of desert associated with marriage 
and employment. That story starts with the American self-image that ours is 
a middle-class country.34 At the center of this ideal is the belief that those 
 
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/02/08/employers-health-care-public-option-112380 
[https://perma.cc/8R7S-4MUP]; Christina Wilkie, Biden Puts Health Care Front and Center with 
a Call To Expand Obamacare, CNBC (Nov. 10, 2020, 5:53 PM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/11/10/biden-presses-for-expanding-obamacare-even-as-s.html 
[https://perma.cc/7TP8-H752]. 
 32. “Employment” here refers to employment at any given time with a particular employer. 
 33. See also Rosalind Dixon & Julie Suk, Liberal Constitutionalism and Economic 
Inequality, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 369, 375 (2018) (noting that “many constitutional 
democracies . . . are actively considering, and passing, measures to increase investments in 
education and training, raise the minimum wage, [and] guarantee a universal basic income”). 
 34. The middle class can be defined to include “people . . . who are prepared to make 
sacrifices to create a better life for themselves but who have not started with life’s material 
problems solved because they have material assets to make their lives easy.” John Parker, 
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who acquire the right assets, observe the right values, make the right 
investments, and form the right families for themselves and their children can 
enjoy a better life.35 For that to be true, however, families must have access 
not just to the means of subsistence but also to a surplus that allows them to 
invest in their own and their children’s futures.36 
At the time of the country’s founding, the United States could think of 
itself as a relatively egalitarian country because the principal source of family 
security, stability, and surplus lay with land ownership—and land in the 
United States, unlike Europe, was readily available.37 The families of the 
colonial era rested on three pillars: an effective male monopoly on access to 
land ownership; land ownership as a prerequisite to marriage, at least for 
white men; and the marriage-defined homestead as a source of family, 
stability, and security.38 
 
Burgeoning Bourgeoisie, ECONOMIST (Feb. 14, 2009), https://www.economist.com/special-
report/2009/02/14/burgeoning-bourgeoisie [https://perma.cc/Q226-A5ZC] (quoting Brazilian 
economist Eduardo Giannetti da Fonseca). At the time of its founding, the United States was more 
egalitarian than Europe because of the lack of an entrenched aristocracy. Infra note 37 and 
accompanying text. And in the early days of the Republic, 90% of the population lived on farms, 
with farm ownerships relatively available in comparison with Europe in the same time period. 
Infra notes 37, 43 and accompanying text. The concept of a “middle class” between wealthy 
capitalists and an unskilled working class is nonetheless thought of a creation of the industrial 
age. See generally STUART M. BLUMIN, THE EMERGENCE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS (1989). 
 35. Parker, supra note 34. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See BLUMIN, supra note 34, at 108–09 (describing the United States’ self-image as an 
“egalitarian republic”); MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY 
IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 5 (G. Edward White ed., 1985) (referring to novel 
circumstances in the New World including the availability of land). These descriptions, however, 
were never true of the South. The South, even looking just at whites, was much more radically 
unequal than the North; it resembled “extractive” colonial cultures in a way the North never did. 
See DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL 351–57 (2012). At the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, over ninety percent of African-Americans in the United 
States were enslaved people. See Aaron O’Neill, Black and Slave Population of the United States 
from 1790-1880, STATISTA (Feb. 12 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/1010169/black-
and-slave-population-us-1790-1880/ [https://perma.cc/GPF7-5BD6]. And freed blacks often 
faced discrimination and limits on their ability to own land, depending on the area of the country. 
See, e.g., Macarty v. Mandeville, 3 La. Ann. 239, 240 (1848) (holding that given the anti-
miscegenation laws, an African-American woman had no claim to the property of her partner but 
could keep the property that was the result of her own efforts). In addition, even for whites, the 
South was a more stratified society and grew increasingly so over time. “In 1850, 17 percent of 
the farming population held two-thirds of all acres in the rich cotton-growing regions of the 
South.” The South’s Economy, DIGIT. HIST., 
https://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/disp_textbook.cfm?smtid=2&psid=3558 [https://perma.cc/
4N9A-3XDL]. 
 38. While women could own property during this period, their husbands gained the right to 
manage the property when the women entered into marriage. Richard H. Chused, History’s 
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The Industrial Revolution and the urbanization that accompanied it 
destabilized that regime. It involved a wholesale shift from farm production 
to wage labor as the principal source of family support.39 Wage income, 
however, was intrinsically less stable than farm production.40 In the early 
years of the Industrial Revolution, it increased family vulnerability to 
economic downturns, injuries, and premature deaths.41 Moreover, by 
enlisting men, women, and children in factory labor, it undermined the basis 
for human capital investment that provided the pathways into the middle 
class.42 
This section describes the creation of the male “family wage” as the 
solution that, by the middle of the twentieth century, created pathways into 
the stable middle class for the majority of working-class white families. This 
system rested on coupling family security with a male monopoly on access 
to the “good jobs” in the new industrial order, recreating women’s 
dependence within marriage, and extending access to these benefits in the 
middle of the twentieth century through social insurance, unionization, and 
labor market regulation. 
A. The Agrarian Family Safety Net 
In 1800, the family farm served as the primary source of security and 
stability for American families. Ninety percent of Americans lived on 
farms,43 and the farm-based families of the era were described as “little 
commonwealths.”44 They were hierarchically organized, self-sufficient, 
interdependent households,45 with all members contributing to their 
economic viability. The security they provided rested on male property 
 
Double Edge: A Comment on Modernization of Marital Status Law, 82 GEO. L.J. 2213, 2215 
(1994) (explaining effect of coverture). On race, see generally Eleanor Brown and June Carbone, 
Race, Property, and Citizenship (2021) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors) (providing 
historical context on the pathways of Blacks into the middle class). 
 39. Hilary Land, The Family Wage, 6 FEMINIST REV. 55, 56–57 (1980). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Univ. of Wis.-Green Bay, How Did Industrialization Alter the Family, FOUNDS. OF W. 
CULTURE: THE INDUS. REVOLUTION, http://foundations.uwgb.org/family/ 
[https://perma.cc/6BKK-6VMY]. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Beth Waterhouse, A Sustainable Future?, PBS, 
https://www.pbs.org/ktca/farmhouses/sustainable_future.html [https://perma.cc/K33P-8DTN] 
(stating that 90% of the U.S. population lived on farms in the nineteenth century). 
 44. GROSSBERG, supra note 37, at 4–5 (citing JOHN DEMOS, A LITTLE COMMONWEALTH: 
FAMILY LIFE IN PLYMOUTH COLONY, at x (1970)). 
 45. Anne C. Dailey, Constitutional Privacy and the Just Family, 67 TUL. L. REV. 955, 964–
65 (1993). “This ‘little commonwealth’ of family life was public not only in the economic sense, 
but as the phrase implies, in the full political sense as well.” Id. at 965. 
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ownership as the foundation for marriage, patriarchal administration of the 
farm economy to address the subsistence needs of its residents, and restriction 
of the alternatives in ways that made marriage compulsory for childrearing 
and a permanent source of support for dependents.46 
Well into the nineteenth century, the role of government, whether federal 
or state, was limited.47 Instead, the family served as a basic unit of production 
and community.48 Farm households produced products for domestic 
consumption and, perhaps, for sale, complementing any commercial crops 
they might have grown with hunting, fishing, garden plots, and animal 
husbandry.49 Farmwives made their own clothes; farm parents trained their 
children in the agricultural methods and crafts necessary to sustain an 
agricultural economy.50 The farm economy, which principally consisted of 
subsistence farms that provided for their residents with minimal surpluses, 
effectively provided its own social safety net, which extended to the young, 
the comparatively few elderly (at a time of shorter lifespans), the disabled, 
and the dependent.51 
Domestic relations were governed in accordance with English common 
law. A man’s land ownership52 signaled readiness for family formation, and 
principles of coverture treated the husband as head of the family, with the 
power to administer all of the family’s resources, including any separate 
property the wife may have owned before the marriage or income she 
received during the union.53 In return, the husband had a duty to support the 
 
 46. See GROSSBERG, supra note 37, at 5 (describing the household as patriarchal and women 
and children as subordinate and dependent); id. at 235 (identifying paternal authority with 
property ownership); id. at 200 (describing how “bastardy law” sought to ensure birth within 
marriage). 
 47. Id. at 17–18. 
 48. Id. at 4–5 (describing comprehensive roles of families). 
 49. Dailey, supra note 45, at 966 n.25 (stating that before the nineteenth century, most farms 
involved cooperative economic activities whether production was for subsistence or sale). 
 50. Univ. of Wis.-Green Bay, supra note 41. 
 51. Indeed, in 1850, 75% of those over the age of sixty-five lived in multigenerational 
families compared to fewer than 20% in 1975. Steven Ruggles, Patriarchy, Power, and Pay: The 
Transformation of American Families, 1800-2015, 52 DEMOGRAPHY 1797, 1798 fig.1 (2015); see 
also GROSSBERG, supra note 37, at 5 (describing dependents as subject to the authority of the 
patriarch). 
 52. Those who could not afford to own land, those unwilling to move, and those freed after 
the Civil War might instead become tenant farmers or sharecroppers. See Charles C. Bolton, 
Farmers Without Land: The Plight of White Tenant Farmers and Sharecroppers, MISS. HIST. 
NOW (Mar. 2004), http://mshistorynow.mdah.state.ms.us/articles/228/index.php 
[https://perma.cc/G63F-AS78]. 
 53. Coverture involved a complicated system that treated marriage as the union not just of 
husband and wife but also of two different family lines administered in the context of a system of 
male descent. See, e.g., Albertina Antognini, Nonmarital Coverture, 99 B.U. L. REV. 2139, 2150 
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wife, while the wife was expected to provide domestic services.54 Divorce 
was legally difficult and rare;55 if the couple separated, the husband would 
typically retain the farm while the wife had limited means of support and few 
places to go.56 The husband’s legal authority over the household was thus 
deeply entrenched. Indeed, the law of domestic relations was combined, in 
treatises of the period, with the laws of master and servant.57 
B. Coupling: Industrialization and the Rise of the Family Wage 
Ideology 
While traditionalists like to present the marital family as timeless and 
enduring,58 the change from an agricultural economy to an industrial one 
undermined family security, requiring a reorganization of family roles—and 
ultimately a greater role for the state.59 With industrialization, commercial 
production moved out of the household and into factories and offices.60 
Urbanization separated family households from food production, creating 
greater reliance on market economies.61 Wage labor replaced property 
ownership as the primary source of support for urban families, with the farm 
population falling to 40% of the American public by 1900.62 
 
(2019); Allison Anna Tait, The Beginning of the End of Coverture: A Reappraisal of the Married 
Woman’s Separate Estate, 26 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 165, 174 (2014) (explaining how women’s 
lack of control even of property held in their names made the husbands’ support critical). 
 54. Tait, supra note 53, at 179. 
 55. See, e.g., Allison Anna Tait, Divorce Equality, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1245, 1255 (2015) 
(observing that the southern states did not adopt judicial divorce until after the Civil War). 
 56. At death, farmland typically passed to the sons, who cared for the dependent widow. 
The widow’s dower interest prevented the sale of the farm without her consent, but it entitled her 
to only a one-third life interest. On inheritance patterns, see Richard H. Chused, Married Women’s 
Property and Inheritance by Widows in Massachusetts: A Study of Wills Probated Between 1800 
and 1850, 2 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 42, 47–49 (1986). 
 57. See 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 104 (John M. Gould ed., 14th 
ed. 1896) (“The primary and most important of the domestic relations is that of husband and wife. 
It has its foundations in nature, and is the only lawful relation by which Providence has permitted 
the continuance of the human race. . . . It is one of the chief foundations of social order.”); 
Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, Breaking Down Status, 98 WASH. U. L. REV. 671, 673–74 (2021). 
 58. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 689–90 (2015) (Roberts, C. J., dissenting) (citing 
JAMES Q. WILSON, THE MARRIAGE PROBLEM: HOW OUR CULTURE HAS WEAKENED FAMILIES 41 
(2002)). 
 59. For a discussion of the expanded role of the state, see infra Part I.C. 
 60. Land, supra note 39 (describing movement of production into factories). 
 61. See Dailey, supra note 45, at 966 (describing how “productive work previously 
performed within the family was removed to the outside workplace”). 
 62. Although 60% of the population still lived in rural areas. JAYSON L. LUSK, MERCATUS 
CTR., THE EVOLVING ROLE OF THE USDA IN THE FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL ECONOMY 7 (2016), 
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The new system increased economic inequality and made family security 
more precarious. The rising middle classes, starting in the Northeast before 
the Civil War, set the new standard: the husband, often employed in the 
professions, finance, or the managerial ranks,63 could earn enough money in 
the paid workforce to support a family.64 His wife supervised “a remade 
domestic realm shorn of productive activities such as clothes making or bean 
picking,” which enabled middle-class families to invest more in the education 
and moral instruction of their young.65 This model identified the family’s 
middle-class status with the careful selection of the right marital partners who 
could couple a husband’s middle-class earning capacity with the wife’s 
ability to cultivate middle-class education and values.66 
At the beginning of the industrial era, however, this model was beyond the 
reach of the working class, who moved into the factory jobs of the new era.67 
These families could not afford to keep women and children out of the labor 
market,68 often because the men did not make enough to support the family 
on their own or because the men’s jobs were too insecure.69 An injury or 
layoff could threaten the family’s livelihood.70 And economic downturns 
 
https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/Lusk-USDA-v1.pdf [https://perma.cc/8EAG-KBCH]; see 
also Ruggles, supra note 51, at 1800–03 (describing transformation from property-based wealth 
to wage labor). 
 63. Univ. of Wis.-Green Bay, supra note 41. 
 64. See, e.g., MARY P. RYAN, CRADLE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS: THE FAMILY IN ONEIDA 
COUNTY, NEW YORK, 1790-1865, at 184–85 (1981). 
 65. June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Whither/Wither Alimony?, 93 TEX. L. REV. 925, 945 
(2015) (book review) (describing the much younger ages of marriage and lesser emphasis on 
education in working-class families). 
 66. RYAN, supra note 64, at 185. 
 67. Id. at 153 (describing how the immigrant working class in the Northeast supplied the 
factory labor in the new economy, with children going to work at young ages). 
 68. See Martha May, The Historical Problem of the Family Wage: The Ford Motor 
Company and the Five Dollar Day, 8 FEMINIST STUD. 399, 401 (1982) (explaining that at the 
beginning of the industrial era, wages for unskilled male labor were rarely enough to support more 
than a single person); Ileen A. DeVault, Family Wages: The Roles of Wives and Mothers in U.S. 
Working-Class Survival Strategies, 1880-1930, 54 LAB. HIST. 1, 1–3 (2013) (describing how 
women filled in economic gaps). 
 69. See, e.g., Elizabeth Pleck, A Mother’s Wages: Income Earning Among Married Italian 
and Black Women, 1896-1911, in THE AMERICAN FAMILY IN SOCIAL-HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
490, 490–515 (Michael Gordon ed., 3d ed. 1983) (describing how African-American families 
preferred to have the wives work so the children could stay in school while Italian immigrant 
families sent the children to work at early ages so the wives could remain home). 
 70. The (Fascinating) History of Workers’ Compensation Insurance, PIE INS., 
https://pieinsurance.com/blog/workers-comp/the-fascinating-history-of-workers-compensation-
insurance/ [https://perma.cc/Y6RP-T6KW] (“[I]n 1913 alone, more than 25,000 employees were 
killed in work-related accidents and about 700,000 were seriously injured. Considered the first 
type of social insurance in the United States, workers’ comp provisions were adopted rapidly. 
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could result in large-scale unemployment.71 Women and children filled in the 
gaps.72 Particularly during economic downturns, family “disorganization” 
increased.73 Working-class families were often locked in poverty; they lacked 
the means to invest in themselves and their children’s future.74 
Over time, however, the union movement sought to secure the benefits of 
the middle-class family model for a larger part of the country. An important 
part of its strategy involved the fight for the family wage.75 The idea of the 
family wage, which began in the United States in the mid-nineteenth 
century,76 involved two concepts as the key to societal stability: gendered 
family roles and gender-segmented labor markets. 
The first concept, gendered family roles, involved the ideology of 
domesticity, which recreated female dependence through the design of 
gender-differentiated family roles.77 This model assigned men the obligation 
to secure sufficient income to support the family and charged women with 
responsibility for home and children.78 The agrarian family had hierarchical 
roles; men and women might work side-by-side, but the women were subject 
to their husband’s authority.79 The industrial family designed complementary 
ones; husbands’ breadwinning moved to the market while wives received a 
 
Thirty-six more states followed suit before the close of the decade. In fact, by 1921, only six states 
had not authorized compensation for workplace injuries,” with Mississippi, the last state, doing 
so in 1948 (footnotes omitted)). 
 71. In 1931, Wisconsin adopted a comprehensive labor code; it had earlier been the first 
state in the nation to enact unemployment compensation. Shirley S. Abrahamson & Elizabeth A. 
Hartman, Building a More Perfect Union: Wisconsin’s Contribution to Constitutional 
Jurisprudence, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 677, 689. 
 72. Land, supra note 39, at 57 (describing how “initially the whole family went into the 
factory”). 
 73. During the Great Depression, for example, marriage rates declined, the number of 
children placed in settings outside their families increased, and while divorce rates fell, desertion 
rates increased. Dennis Bryson, Impact of the Great Depression on Family and Home, 
ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM, https://www.encyclopedia.com/economics/encyclopedias-almanacs-
transcripts-and-maps/family-and-home-impact-great-depression [https://perma.cc/J8R9-JJ6N] 
(Feb. 16, 2021). 
 74. See id. 
 75. See, e.g., Lilach Lurie, Unions and Unequal Pay: The Establishment of the “Family 
Wage,” 157 INT’L LABOUR REV. 153, 156–57 (2018) (describing how unions pushed for the 
creation of the family wage in the period before the development of the welfare state). 
 76. May, supra note 68, at 401. 
 77. See Dailey, supra note 45, at 967 (describing the gender ideology of the separate 
spheres). 
 78. Maxine Eichner, The Privatized American Family, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 213, 252–
53 (2017) (describing welfare state model built on a model of “separate spheres,” in which women 
performed caretaking at home while men engaged in paid labor outside the home); see also May, 
supra note 68, at 403 (distinguishing between middle-class domesticity and working-class 
concerns about survival). 
 79. GROSSBERG, supra note 37, at 4–5 (describing patriarchal authority). 
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limited form of authority in the home, now shorn of its commercial role.80 
The rise of the family wage reinforced the importance of marriage as both 
men and women gained status from gender-differentiated marital roles.81 The 
male family wage thus united male success with female dependence as 
critical to the attainment of middle-class status.82 
The second concept underlying the fight for the family wage was 
reinforcement of gender-segmented labor markets. At the beginning of the 
industrial era, working-class men, women, and children often went off to the 
factories together—although, even then, the jobs were typically sex-
segregated, and the women paid substantially less.83 
The Supreme Court accepted the gender differentiation on which the 
system rested. In 1905, the Supreme Court’s decision in Lochner v. New York 
famously struck down a law that limited the maximum hours an employee 
could work on the ground that such laws violated freedom of contract.84 Three 
years later, in Muller v. Oregon, the Court upheld a similar law.85 The 
difference was that the Oregon law only applied to women.86 Men, according 
to the Court, had the right to enter into onerous employment contracts if they 
chose.87 On the other hand, women’s “physical structure and a proper 
discharge of her maternal functions—having in view not merely her own 
 
 80. See Joan Williams, From Difference to Dominance to Domesticity: Care as Work, 
Gender as Tradition, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1441, 1445 (2001) (describing the change in the male 
role “from patriarch to breadwinner”). This authority takes the form of what Reva Siegel labels 
as “preservation-through-transformation.” Reva B. Siegel, ‘‘The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as 
Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2119 (1996). 
 81. See Ruggles, supra note 51, at 1798, 1800 fig.3 (2015) (indicating over 90% of women 
married by their mid-forties from the early 19th century through the 1970s, but that the number 
has steadily fallen since then). 
 82. See May, supra note 68, at 401–02 (referring to a man’s ability to spare his wife from 
“the drudgery of the cotton mill” (quoting Heidi Hartmann, The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism 
and Feminism: Towards a More Progressive Union, CAP. & CLASS, Summer 1979, at 16). But 
see Land, supra note 39, at 57 (describing the change in female roles as one “from partners to 
parasites”). 
 83. Univ. of Wis.-Green Bay, Women’s Roles in the Industrial Revolution, FOUNDS. OF W. 
CULTURE: THE INDUS. REVOLUTION, http://foundations.uwgb.org/womensroles/ 
[https://perma.cc/ECD8-2DMC] (describing women’s wages as half to a third of what the men 
were paid). Another source notes that the “ratio of female to male earnings, adjusted for time 
inputs, increased from about 0.35 in 1820 for manufacturing workers, to 0.45 in 1890 for all 
workers.” Claudia Goldin & Solomon Polachek, Residual Differences by Sex: Perspectives on the 
Gender Gap in Earnings, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 143, 143 (1987). 
 84. 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905). 
 85. 208 U.S. 412, 423 (1908). 
 86. See Melissa Murray, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Century in the Making, 43 
HARBINGER 91, 92 (2019) (pointing out this distinction). 
 87. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 60–61 (dismissing the notion that “the legislature, in its paternal 
wisdom . . . [has] the right to legislate on the subject of, and to limit, the hours for such labor” 
that jeopardizes worker health). 
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health, but the well-being of the race—justify legislation to protect her from 
the greed as well as the passion of man.”88 The conservative Court of the 
Lochner era was only too happy to embrace the precepts of the middle-class 
family system that identified women’s proper place as in the domestic 
sphere.89 The same Court, however, rejected the use of state power to make 
the middle-class model more accessible to working-class men.90 
The success in winning a family wage, at least before the New Deal,91 
came more from employers’ actions than from legislation.92 In 1914, Henry 
Ford became the first to adopt such a policy; economists have found that 
Ford’s five-dollar day wage, double the norm at the time, resulted in 
“substantial queues for Ford jobs” and “significant increases in Ford 
productivity and profits.”93 As Ford explained when doubling the rate paid to 
married men, “[T]he man does the work in the shop, but his wife does the 
work in the home. The shop must pay them both.”94 
Ford’s competitors eventually followed suit.95 They did so because Ford’s 
higher wages gave Ford Motor Company a competitive advantage.96 The 
 
 88. Muller, 208 U.S. at 422. 
 89. Murray, supra note 86, at 93 (concluding that, in the Court’s view, women needed to be 
protected “when they ventured from their proper place in the domestic sphere into the rough and 
tumble of public life and the marketplace”). In contrast, the United States Supreme Court struck 
down a minimum wage for women in the twenties when the arguments justifying it were too close 
to those justifying similar measures for men. See Adkins v. Child.’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 556 
(1923) (striking down a District of Columbia minimum wage law for women), overruled in part 
by W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 90. Kimberly R. Willoughby, Mothering Labor: Difference as a Device Towards Protective 
Labor Legislation for Men, 1830-1938, 10 J.L. & POLS. 445, 475–76 (1994) (describing how the 
Adkins briefs placed less emphasis on male–female differences than those in Muller). 
 91. The same thing is true for child labor. See Celeste Corlett, Impact of the 2000 Child 
Labor Treaty on United States Child Laborers, 19 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMPAR. L. 713, 716 (2002). 
Congress had initially passed child labor laws in 1916, but the Supreme Court struck them down. 
Id. 
 92. At least initially, many unions relied more on private bargaining to create higher wages 
for unionized jobs rather than pushing for a higher minimum wage. Willoughby, supra note 90, 
at 472. 
 93. Daniel M.G. Raff & Lawrence H. Summers, Did Henry Ford Pay Efficiency Wages?, 5 
J. LAB. ECON. S57, S57 (1987). 
 94. Deborah A. Widiss, Changing the Marriage Equation, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 721, 737 
(2012). 
 95. Raff & Summers, supra note 93, at S83 (“By 1928, before the United Automobile 
Workers had become an important factor in the automobile industry, wages were almost 40% 
greater than in the rest of manufacturing.”). 
 96. As Henry Ford himself said, 
There was . . . no charity in any way involved. . . . We wanted to pay these 
wages so that the business would be on a lasting foundation. . . . [W]e were 
building for the future. A low wage business is always insecure. . . . The 
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major industrialists of 1914 depended on a large labor force.97 Yet, factory 
jobs, particularly with the introduction of Ford’s assembly line, were low 
paid, onerous, and boring.98 The manufacturing system of the era was plagued 
by “low morale, turnover rates and aggressive union agitation.”99 In 1913, 
turnover at the Ford plant reached an annual rate of 370% and absenteeism 
had become chronic.100 Ford changed the dynamic through four measures. 
First, the “family” wages he offered were higher than workers could earn 
elsewhere, winning their loyalty.101 Second, Ford Motor Company developed 
services that benefitted employees’ families, including housing, playgrounds, 
school, libraries, and hospitals.102 Third, the company reined in frivolous or 
arbitrary dismissals, encouraging employees’ expectations that they could 
enjoy a long career at the company.103 Finally, Ford coupled eligibility for the 
higher wages with character requirements, enforced by a “Socialization 
Organization.”104 Organization representatives would visit the employees’ 
homes to ensure that they avoided social ills such as gambling and 
drinking.105 Men were deemed ineligible for the higher wages if their wives 
worked outside the home.106 Women employees rarely had access to the 
 
payment of five dollars a day for an eight-hour day was one of the finest cost-
cutting moves we ever made . . . . 
HENRY FORD IN COLLABORATION WITH SAMUEL CROWTHER, MY LIFE AND WORK 126, 127, 147 
(1922). 
 97. Indeed, Ford Motor Company’s labor force increased from 450 employees in 1908 to 
14,000 employees in 1913. Raff & Summers, supra note 93, at S61–S62. 
 98. Id. at S63–S64. 
 99. Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the Changing 
Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519, 532 (2001). 
 100. Raff & Summers, supra note 93, at S63. 
 101. See Tim Worstall, Opinion, The Story of Henry Ford’s $5 a Day Wages: It’s Not What 
You Think, FORBES (Mar. 4, 2012, 12:28 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2012/03/04/the-story-of-henry-fords-5-a-day-wages-
its-not-what-you-think/ [https://perma.cc/J3XY-2S6C] (emphasizing the role of higher wages in 
securing employee loyalty). 
 102. Stone, supra note 99, at 532. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Worstall, supra note 101; Kashann Kilson, Henry Ford’s Dumbest Ideas Matter 
Because His Smart Ones Changed the World, INVERSE (June 6, 2016, 6:30 AM), 
https://www.inverse.com/article/16307-henry-ford-s-dumbest-ideas-matter-because-his-smart-
ones-changed-the-world [https://perma.cc/S396-33WK]. 
 105. See Sharona Hoffman, Preplacement Examinations and Job-Relatedness: How To 
Enhance Privacy and Diminish Discrimination in the Workplace, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 517, 530 
(2001) (detailing Ford’s oversight of his employees at home and at work); Jonathan C. Lipson, 
Promising Justice: Contract (As) Social Responsibility, 2019 WIS. L. REV. 1109, 1143 (discussing 
how employers monitored workers in both public and private environments). 
 106. Worstall, supra note 101. 
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family wage, though the company held out potential eligibility for women 
who were single and supporting a family.107 
The changes at Ford laid the foundation for a new social system that 
redefined the sources of family security and entry to the middle class. Factory 
work, particularly work on an assembly line for low wages, did little to 
enhance male status. The head-of-household role, especially when coupled 
with membership in an elite club with higher pay (Ford Motor Company), 
conferred substantially greater status. Ford tied that status to marriage and the 
breadwinner role.108 Male success depended on making marriage work,109 and 
women in turn gained status from pairing with a successful man—the 
blue-collar worker of the industrial era gained a more respected social role.110 
Employers in turn gained greater employee loyalty and productivity; with 
longer job tenures, employers also invested more in training employees in 
company-specific skills.111 The above-market wages, particularly for the less 
skilled, made it less appealing for employees to quit and go elsewhere.112 The 
emphasis on the breadwinner role and family-oriented benefits attracted men 
who needed the benefits to be able to maintain their “rightful” place as heads 
of their households113 and would be subject to family as well as employer 
pressure if they shirked their obligations.114 Over time, the increased wages 
 
 107. Id. 
 108. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., A Job Is Not a Hobby: The Judicial Revival of Corporate 
Paternalism and Its Problematic Implications, 41 J. CORP. L. 71, 82 (2015) (discussing the 
expectation that Ford employees get married). 
A worker was eligible for the Five Dollar Day only after he had been at Ford 
for six months, and had to fall into one of three categories: “All married men 
living with and taking good care of their families”; “all single men, over 
twenty-two years of age,” of “proven thrifty habits”; and men under the age of 
twenty-two years of age, and women “who are the sole support of some next 
of kin or blood relative.” 
May, supra note 68, at 413. 
 109. See May, supra note 68, at 413. 
 110. For example, Marlon Brando’s character in A Streetcar Named Desire represented the 
rise of working-class male status. JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS: HOW 
INEQUALITY IS REMAKING THE AMERICAN FAMILY 13 (2014). 
 111. Stone, supra note 99, at 535, 538 (discussing the relationship between long-term job 
tenure and employer investment in employees’ company-specific skills). 
 112. Raff & Summers, supra note 93, at S65 (noting difference between skilled employees 
and the unskilled). 
 113. Id. at S70 (observing that employers saw no need to include women in the family wage 
program because they were less likely “to drink and fail to show up for work”). 
 114. See David Freeman Engstrom, “Not Merely There To Help the Men”: Equal Pay Laws, 
Collective Rights, and the Making of the Modern Class Action, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1, 67 (2018) 
(noting that activists argued that family well-being depended on the men’s ability to support their 
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met not just the family’s subsistence needs but also facilitated the employee’s 
ability to accrue savings, buy a house, meet emergency needs, and pay for 
children’s education.115 In short, like farm ownership in the agrarian era, the 
family wage, premised on breadwinner–homemaker marriages, and coupled 
with secure long-term employment, provided a buffer from hard times that 
promoted family security and stability.116 These benefits, however, which 
started at Ford Motor Company as a way to keep out unions, would not extend 
to most of the blue-collar workforce until the triumph of the union movement 
during the prosperous era following World War II.117 And private 
employment, however generous, could not fully address the risks families 
faced from illness, premature death, or the need to care for the elderly and the 
disabled. Full realization of the promise of the new system would ultimately 
depend not just on private actors but also a greatly expanded state role.118 
C. Complementing Coupling: Social Insurance Tied to Marriage and 
Employment 
By the election of Franklin Roosevelt in 1932, the ideology of the separate 
spheres, and with it, breadwinner–homemaker roles and the corresponding 
celebration of the male family wage was well-established. The problem was 
how to create family security for those who did not share in a family wage 
paid to a male breadwinner. The Great Depression increased the challenges, 
with manufacturing employment declining to 67% of its 1929 level by 
1933.119 The New Deal solution involved the design of social insurance at the 
 
families); see also Land, supra note 39, at 64 (“There was—and is—evidence that men work their 
longest hours when they have dependent children and that men with large families work longer 
hours on average than men with small families.”). 
 115. May, supra note 68, at 401–02. 
 116. See Katherine V.W. Stone, A Fatal Mismatch: Employer-Centric Benefits in a 
Boundaryless World, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 451, 453 (2007) (observing that the system was 
“structured to bind the worker to the firm, thus reflecting and contributing to an emerging 
employment system that valued long-term committed employees”). 
 117. See generally ANDREW J. CHERLIN, LABOR’S LOVE LOST: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE 
WORKING-CLASS FAMILY IN AMERICA 90–119 (2014) (describing how blue-collar workers gained 
in status, particularly in the era following World War II, and have lost ground since). 
 118. See Grace Ganz Blumberg, The Regularization of Nonmarital Cohabitation: Rights and 
Responsibilities in the American Welfare State, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1265, 1266–67 (2001) 
(addressing the need for such a role). 
 119. Michael French, Effects of the Great Depression on Industry, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM, 
https://www.encyclopedia.com/economics/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/indust
ry-effects-great-depression [https://perma.cc/P7GN-YQFB] (Feb. 16, 2021). 
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national level to complement wage labor and reinforce the necessity of 
marriage.120 
In the thirties—as is true today—the debate over an expanded state role 
involved ideological conflict. Those who supported laissez-faire policies 
generally opposed state interference in the market, whether in the form of 
greater market regulation such as the minimum wage or the abolition of child 
labor, higher taxes to fund public initiatives, or direct provision of services.121 
At the same time, European countries were adopting more generous benefits 
than the United States, and Franklin Roosevelt eventually embraced the 
notion that society should guarantee positive socio-economic rights, such as 
“freedom from want.”122 The major New Deal provisions, although they 
greatly expanded the governmental role, operated in a middle ground 
between neoliberal and socialist ideologies: they embraced the concept of 
social insurance designed to address increased risk.123 
Insurance generally involves the collection of premiums from a broad 
group to compensate for losses that disproportionately affect the few.124 
“Social insurance” refers to “government programs that provide monetary 
protection against risks associated with living in an industrial or 
post-industrial society in which income typically derives from paid work.”125 
 
 120. Employers, including the military, had begun providing various forms of pensions and 
other types of social insurance in the nineteenth century. Mark C. Weber, Disability Rights, 
Disability Discrimination, and Social Insurance, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 575, 579 (2009). And 
“[b]etween 1911 and 1920, state legislatures in forty-five states passed workers’ compensation 
laws.” Id.; see also Stone, supra note 116, at 456–57 (describing how the courts initially struck 
down such laws). 
 121. See Laissez-Faire, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/
laissezfaire.asp [https://perma.cc/7655-N5SE] (July 23, 2020) (observing that “[t]he driving 
principle behind laissez-faire . . . is that the less the government is involved in the economy, the 
better off business will be—and by extension, society as a whole”); Ilana Waxman, Hale’s 
Legacy: Why Private Property Is Not a Synonym for Liberty, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1009, 1009 (2006) 
(linking laissez-faire thinking to the modern neoliberal ideology, including the Bush 
Administration’s efforts to privatize social security). 
 122. See Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Annual Message to the Congress (Jan. 6, 1941), in THE 
PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 663, 672 (Russell & Russell 1969) 
(1941) (including freedom from want). 
 123. See Michael J. Graetz & Jerry L. Mashaw, Constitutional Uncertainty and the Design 
of Social Insurance: Reflections on the Obamacare Case, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 343, 350 
(2013) (explaining that while social insurance, like private insurance, “pools risks . . . social 
insurance depends on government action . . . . designed to pursue societal purposes that could not 
or would not be achieved through individual contracting in private insurance markets. Social 
insurance is . . . . a different product . . . .”). 
 124. Id. (“‘Private insurance’ is composed of contracts to pool common risks so that 
statistically predictable economic losses will be experienced as small subtractions from all insured 
persons’ wealth rather than as calamities for an unfortunate few.”). 
 125. Weber, supra note 120, at 578. 
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These benefits are distinguished from “charity” or “welfare” (or for that 
matter, a broader social safety net) through their connection to work, 
provision of benefits triggered by the occurrence of an event (e.g., old age or 
injury) rather than need, designated sources of funding separate from general 
tax revenues and often contributory in nature (e.g., payroll taxes), mandatory 
participation (in part to avoid adverse selection), and legally determined 
benefits.126 At the same time, such programs are different from mandatory 
savings programs or private pensions in that the benefits received may not 
necessarily bear any correlation with the amount an individual contributes, 
and Congress may alter the benefits in accordance with the program’s 
purposes.127 
The Federal Social Security Act of 1935 has been called the “key 
development in American social insurance,”128 marking the adoption of 
comprehensive national programs of old-age security and a federal-state 
unemployment insurance program. As a national approach, the Social 
Security Act rested on three principles: first, recognition that wage labor in 
an industrial economy is intrinsically insecure, given the inevitability of 
untimely deaths, injuries, illness, old age, and recessions; second, that an 
expanded government role was the necessary and appropriate response;129 
and, third, that the programs were grounded in notions of merit and desert.130 
To vindicate these principles, Social Security mimicked private pension 
funds and emphasized the idea that employees had “earned” their benefits 
through the connection to work even though the program’s benefits never 
corresponded in any precise way to an individual employee’s 
contributions.131 The program then extended these benefits to dependents 
 
 126. Id. at 578–80. Senator Walter F. George explained that: “Social Security is not a 
handout; it is not charity; it is not relief. It is an earned right based upon the contributions and 
earnings of the individual. As an earned right, the individual is eligible to receive his benefit in 
dignity and self-respect.” Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 623 (1960) (Black, J., dissenting). 
 127. See Flemming, 363 U.S. at 608–12 (describing congressional ability to take into account 
such factors as the financial soundness of the program or whether a recipient could live in the 
United States). 
 128. Weber, supra note 120, at 579–80. 
 129. See William H. Simon, Rights and Redistribution in the Welfare System, 38 STAN. L. 
REV. 1431, 1446–48 (1986) (discussing market failure rationales for federal insurance programs). 
 130. See infra notes 138–139 and accompanying text; see also Karen M. Tani, Flemming v. 
Nestor: Anticommunism, the Welfare State, and the Making of “New Property,” 26 LAW & HIST. 
REV. 379, 397–400 (2008) (describing how differences between the majority and dissent in the 
5-4 decision reflected the characterization of social security benefits as a property right). It is a 
form of “social insurance,” designed to protect against lost wages based on death, disability, or 
age. Nancy J. Altman, The Striking Superiority of Social Security in the Provision of Wage 
Insurance, 50 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 109, 114 (2013). 
 131. See Simon, supra note 129, at 1479–80 (estimating that about 70% 
of Social Security payments “represented actuarially unearned transfers from younger workers”). 
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through marriage,132 replicating and reinforcing the family wage ideology 
that had taken hold more generally.133 
Indeed, the Act’s origins can be traced to the federal pension system, 
which had provided benefits to veterans throughout the nineteenth century.134 
Congress subsequently expanded the pension system to cover Civil War and 
other military widows.135 These programs, which required proof of marriage, 
served as forerunners to the Social Security program.136 The New Deal 
architects, in 1935 and the subsequent 1939 Amendments, expanded 
government benefits, tying eligibility to compensation for loss of a married 
male breadwinner, albeit for a limited group of families.137 The Aid to 
Dependent Children (ADC) program, which was something of an 
afterthought to the social legislation, limited coverage to children under 
sixteen who had been “deprived of parental support or care by reason of the 
death, continued absence from the home, or physical or mental incapacity of 
a parent.”138 Even then, the legislation gave the states leeway to add moral 
character requirements that could be used to limit minority women’s access 
 
 132. Indeed, the estimates in the 1980s were that women received 54% of benefits while 
paying only 28% of social security contributions because women lived longer, earned less, and 
received more in the way of derivative benefits (that is, benefits calculated in terms of a spouse’s 
or parent’s earnings rather than their own). Id. at 1482. 
 133. Linda Gordon, What Does Welfare Regulate?, 55 SOC. RSCH. 609, 614 (1988). In 
Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282, 283 (1979), the Supreme Court observed, in describing the 
programs, that “the Government has taken increasingly upon itself the task of insulating the 
economy at large and the individual from the buffeting of economic fortune.” 
 134. Kristin A. Collins, Federalism, Marriage, and Heather Gerken’s Mad Genius, 95 B.U. 
L. REV. 615, 621 (2015). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 621–23. See generally ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY: WOMEN, 
MEN, AND THE QUEST FOR ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP IN 20TH-CENTURY AMERICA (2001) (providing 
a history of social insurance for women based on marriage); THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING 
SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 427–
524 (1992) (comprehensive history of social insurance programs in the United States); Kristin A. 
Collins, Administering Marriage: Marriage-Based Entitlements, Bureaucracy, and the Legal 
Construction of the Family, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1085, 1091 (2009) (noting the historically “central 
role of marriage law in the development of social provision for women in the United States”). 
 137. JUNE CARBONE, FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS: THE SECOND REVOLUTION IN FAMILY 
LAW 201–02 (2000). 
 138. LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY OF 
WELFARE 277 (1994). “After the enactment of Aid to Dependent Children in 1935, morality 
requirements continued to exclude blacks; ‘man-in-the-house’ rules simultaneously discouraged 
the formation of two-parent families while policing the behavior of single women.” Catherine J. 
Ross & Naomi R. Cahn, Subsidy for Caretaking in Families: Lessons from Foster Care, 8 AM. 
U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 55, 63–64 (1999). 
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to benefits.139 These restrictions remained in place through the 1960s.140 The 
ADC benefits, which were means tested, never gained the perceived 
legitimacy of European family allowances, which extended benefits to all 
children,141 or the social security program with its links (however attenuated 
in practice) to payroll taxes. 
D. Completion of the Scaffolding: Unionization and Health Care 
Overall, the expanded government role provided a measure of security for 
those who coupled the good jobs of the industrial era with enduring 
marriages.142 The system reached its height during the period of relative 
prosperity and economic equality that followed World War II. And the 
expansion of family security and stability involved a de facto pact, with 
government, unions, and private industry acting together to improve worker 
well-being. The system was corporatist in nature, with government and 
unions often acting through large corporations in ways that proved mutually 
reinforcing.143 
This system rested on three elements. First, the Roosevelt Administration 
had pushed labor legislation in 1935 that strengthened union ability to 
organize and engage in collective bargaining.144 Union membership grew 
steadily after that and reached its height as a percentage of total employment 
 
 139. GORDON, supra note 139, at 277; CARBONE, supra note 137, at 201 (observing that 
European nations provided child allowance to encourage more births to women of “native stock”); 
see also Dorothy E. Roberts, Welfare and the Problem of Black Citizenship, 105 YALE L.J. 1563, 
1569 (1996) (book review) (noting the United States focused on “the social control of poor 
immigrant families and the neglect of Black women”). 
 140. CARBONE, supra note 137, at 202. 
 141. Id. 
 142.  
New Deal legislation . . . sought to protect the family’s income against the 
breadwinner’s loss of salary, creating a statutory scheme for unemployment 
compensation in case of a lost job, and social security retirement when he 
retired, as well as survivors’ and dependents’ benefits if he died. It also 
supported women’s roles in homemaking and caregiving when there was no 
functioning breadwinner. 
Eichner, supra note 78, at 251 (citation omitted). 
 143. John Kenneth Galbraith describes the system as one of countervailing powers. JOHN 
KENNETH GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF COUNTERVAILING POWER 196–
200 (1956). 
 144. The National Labor Relations Act, passed in 1935, guaranteed employees’ rights to 
self-organization and collective bargaining. 29 U.S.C. § 157. 
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in the mid-fifties.145 Second, with greater government support of labor,146 
corporate America reached a “concordat” that ushered in an era of relative 
labor peace.147 Third, labor and government both enhanced family security 
by acting through corporations.148 
The result was a corporate-based welfare system. For example, while 
unions in the early part of the twentieth century focused on improving wages 
and working conditions, after World War II, they placed greater emphasis on 
social insurance—often provided through private employers.149 Katherine 
Stone observes that from “1945 to 1970, the percentage of firms that offered 
pensions grew from 19% to 45%.”150 Union victories also made it harder to 
fire employees and tied increases in wages, benefits, and job security more 
closely to seniority.151 This further enhanced the status of long-term 
employees, increasing the disadvantages of women who took time out of the 
labor market to raise children.152 
Perhaps the most emblematic aspect of this system involved health 
insurance. The United States, unlike most of the developed world, has never 
guaranteed universal health care to its citizens.153 Instead, it created a 
 
 145. See Matthew T. Bodie, Labor Interests and Corporate Power, 99 B.U. L. REV. 1123, 
1125 (2019) (“[B]y the mid-1950s unions represented over one-third of the American 
workforce.”); GERALD MAYER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL32553, UNION MEMBERSHIP TRENDS IN 
THE UNITED STATES 11 fig.1 (2004), 
https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20040831_RL32553_e5e58e1832de83247c0883a6fd691b
c84691a745.pdf [https://perma.cc/AU22-69TV] (documenting trends). 
 146. See John W. Cioffi, Fiduciaries, Federalization, and Finance Capitalism: Berle’s 
Ambiguous Legacy and the Collapse of Countervailing Power, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1081, 
1103–04 (2011) (maintaining that government intervention on labor’s behalf was “the most 
critical, controversial, and divisive manifestation of governmental intervention to 
promote countervailing power.”). 
 147. Harwell Wells, “Corporation Law Is Dead”: Heroic Managerialism, Legal Change, 
and the Puzzle of Corporation Law at the Height of the American Century, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 
305, 322 (2013) (describing the agreement as one where corporate managers would be “left to 
run their businesses as they saw fit, and, in return, labor unions received income and benefits 
sufficient to carry their members into the middle class”). 
 148. Stone, supra note 116, at 454–55. 
 149. Id. at 459 (“[U]nions’ position on social insurance took an about-face during World War 
II.”). 
 150. Id. 
 151. See Alfred W. Blumrosen, Seniority Rights and Industrial Change: Zdanok v. Glidden 
Co., 47 MINN. L. REV. 505, 505 (1963). 
 152. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 116, at 460 (“The firm provided job security, training, social 
insurance, and orderly advancement opportunities and obtained a loyal and knowledgeable work 
force in return. The longer employees stayed on the job, the more their wages rose and their 
benefits vested, giving them a greater stake in the firms over time.”). 
 153. Timothy Callaghan, 3 Reasons the U.S. Doesn’t Have Universal Health Coverage, U.S. 
NEWS (Oct. 26, 2016, 12:22 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/national-news/articles/2016-
10-26/3-reasons-the-us-doesnt-have-universal-health-coverage [https://perma.cc/Y68E-N8PL]. 
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patchwork quilt of programs built around employer-centered benefits.154 That 
system gained hold during World War II when employers sought to get 
around wartime wage and price controls by offering a new benefit—health 
insurance plans for employees and their families.155 Following the war, 
employers, who received generous tax treatment of the costs, expanded the 
programs.156 By 2010, employer-provided health insurance had become the 
largest tax expenditure in the federal budget, with most employees having the 
option of including family members in their plans.157 Using tax subsidies to 
finance private employer plans effectively disguised the substantial federal 
role in ensuring health care availability. 
Yet, precisely because the United States has refused to guarantee health 
care as a right, the provisions never reached the entire population.158 In the 
sixties, the federal government dealt with seniors by directly financing 
Medicare, a health insurance plan for those over the age of sixty-five, through 
payroll taxes.159 Spouses receive derivative eligibility through their 
partners.160 The less generous Medicaid program, in contrast, is administered 
through the states and tied eligibility to need.161 Over time, it would come to 
cover a high percentage of the nation’s children, particularly those born to 
 
 154. See Thomas C. Buchmueller & Alan C. Monheit, Employer-Sponsored Health 
Insurance and the Promise of Health Insurance Reform, 46 INQUIRY 187, 188 (2009). 
 155. See id. (“The link between employment and private health insurance was strengthened 
during World War II when the War Labor Board ruled in 1943 that controls over wages and prices 
imposed by the 1942 Stabilization Act did not apply to fringe benefits such as health insurance.”). 
 156. Id. 
 157. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 114TH CONG., JCX-141R-15, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL 
TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2015–2019, at 28–42 tbl.1 (2015), 
http://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4857 [https://perma.cc/25C7-DYZ9]. 
Before adoption of the ACA, the exclusion for employer-provided health insurance was the 
largest federal tax expenditure, with an annual value of $246.1 billion in 2007. David Gamage, 
Perverse Incentives Arising from the Tax Provisions of Healthcare Reform: Why Further Reforms 
Are Needed To Prevent Avoidable Costs to Low- and Moderate-Income Workers, 65 TAX L. REV. 
669, 681 (2012). 
 158. In the mid-nineties, for example, 14% of children and 19% of adults lacked health 
insurance coverage. SAMANTHA ARTIGA & PETRY UBRI, KAISER FAM. FOUND., KEY ISSUES IN 
CHILDREN’S HEALTH COVERAGE 2 fig.1 (2017), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/key-
issues-in-childrens-health-coverage/ [https://perma.cc/7DDX-EQ5J]. 
 159. History of SSA During the Johnson Administration 1963-1968, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 
https://www.ssa.gov/history/ssa/lbjmedicare1.html [https://perma.cc/6XGM-9B92]. 
 160. Retirement Benefits, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 
https://www.ssa.gov/benefits/retirement/planner/applying7.html [https://perma.cc/F7CE-
ZUKN]. 
 161. What Is the Difference Between Medicare and Medicaid?, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUM. SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/answers/medicare-and-medicaid/what-is-the-difference-
between-medicare-medicaid/index.html [https://perma.cc/96MY-FXGA]. 
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unmarried parents.162 Yet, many voters see Medicare, a federally 
administered program, as a matter of right akin to Social Security,163 while 
Medicaid benefits remain less popular, less secure, and more subject to the 
vagaries of state politics.164 
* * * 
Industrialization began to take hold in the United States in the early part 
of the nineteenth century.165 The United States succeeded in bringing a 
measure of stability and security to the families of the industrial age more 
than a hundred years later.166 Central to that security was the role of the male 
family head, able to provide for a family because of the guarantee of lifelong 
employment, with steady raises, ample insurance, and societal respect.167 
Male working-class income almost doubled, controlling for inflation, 
between 1950 and the early seventies, and companies benefitted as 
productivity increased along with wages.168 Virtually everyone (94% of men 
and 96% of women) married, with the average age of marriage falling 
substantially in the post-war period.169 Children were more likely to be raised 
 
 162. “For the nation’s youngest children, Medicaid and CHIP play an outsized role, 
covering 45 percent of children under the age of six, compared to 36 percent of children between 
the ages of six and 18.” ALISA CHESTER & ELISABETH WRIGHT BURAK, GEORGETOWN UNIV. 
HEALTH POL’Y INST., MEDICAID’S ROLE FOR YOUNG CHILDREN 1 (2016), 
https://ccf.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/MedicaidYoungChildren.pdf [https://
perma.cc/6MMN-XWSA]. CHIP involves a health care plan specifically tailored to ensure 
coverage for children through Medicaid as well as a separate CHIP program, and it is administered 
by the states. Children’s Health Insurance Program, MEDICAID.GOV, 
https://www.medicaid.gov/chip/index.html [https://perma.cc/R4R4-P3ZE]. 
 163. See Mollyann Brodie, Elizabeth C. Hamel & Mira Norton, Medicare as Reflected in 
Public Opinion, 39 J. AM. SOC’Y ON AGING 134, 135 (2015), https://www.kff.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/06/generations-medicare-as-reflected-in-public-opinion-brodie-et-al.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Z2HT-6F4H] (stating 96% of the public views Medicare as important for the 
public). 
 164. Data Note: 5 Charts About Public Opinion on Medicaid, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Feb. 
28, 2020), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/poll-finding/data-note-5-charts-about-public-opinion-
on-medicaid/ [https://perma.cc/F2ND-YH2S] (showing a partisan divide in approval of 
Medicaid). For a discussion of stereotypes of recipients of social assistance programs, such as 
Medicaid, see Catherine Powell & Camille Gear Rich, The “Welfare Queen” Goes to the Polls: 
Race-Based Fractures in Gender Politics and Opportunities for Intersectional Coalitions, 108 
GEO. L.J. 105, 109 (2020). 
 165. CHERLIN, supra note 117, at 1. 
 166. Id. at 85. 
 167. Id. at 92–93 (describing how the role of the father as sole provider and family head, 
irrespective of occupation, still seems fulfilling and ennobling to many men). 
 168. Id. at 93. 
 169. Id. at 94–95. 
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in a two-parent household than before or since170 because death rates declined 
and divorce rates, which had been rising since the Civil War, leveled off.171 
Wives described marriage in terms of greater security, comfort, stability, and 
status that their unmarried friends envied.172 This ideal was built on secure 
jobs that, while they were not necessarily fulfilling, paid a male family wage 
that enhanced the husband’s authority within the family and status among his 
peers. 
This system, even at its height in the postwar era, never benefitted 
everyone.173 The “good” industrial jobs were largely restricted to white 
men,174 and the New Deal legislation creating social insurance intentionally 
excluded farmworkers and domestic workers, who were overwhelmingly 
nonwhite, thus failing to reach those most in need.175 Social insurance tied to 
employment and marriage never sought to be universal; it did, however, 
increase the stability and security associated with wage labor.176 
II. DECOUPLING AND THE RETURN OF FAMILY INSTABILITY 
Just as the industrial age destabilized the sources of stability in the agrarian 
age, so too has the information age dismantled the family wage of the 
industrial era. A growing academic literature describes the different 
components—women’s greater economic independence and changing family 
dynamics; the disappearance of high-paid manufacturing jobs for blue-collar 
 
 170. Id. at 115 (observing that it is the only period in which working-class families were able 
to realize “the culturally potent ideal of the breadwinner husband and the homemaker wife, at 
least during the years when they had preschool-age children at home”). 
 171. Id. at 99. 
 172. Id. at 100. 
 173. Id. at 116–17. 
 174. See id. at 87–88. African-American men, however, gained increased access, particularly 
in the Northern states, in the forties and made some progress in the fifties. Id. at 87, 94. 
 175. See Simon, supra note 129, at 1442–43 (concluding that while the insurance state 
“afforded an important degree of security to a substantial segment of the working class, . . . with 
relatively dignified and secure employment and favorable working conditions and 
compensation,” it left out “a relatively unorganized sector, with relatively low status, irregular 
work, and unfavorable working conditions and compensation”). A substantial literature 
documents the racism that contributed to these arrangements. See, e.g., Dorothy E. 
Roberts, Irrationality and Sacrifice in the Welfare Reform Consensus, 81 VA. L. REV. 2607, 2620 
(1995) (observing that “Northern and Southern Democrats struck a deal that systematically denied 
blacks eligibility for Social Security benefits, omitting federal eligibility standards and excluding 
agricultural workers and domestic servants in a deliberate effort to maintain a black menial labor 
caste in the South. Even Aid to Dependent Children was created for white mothers, who were not 
expected to work.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 176. Simon, supra note 129, at 1140–41. 
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men and the corresponding increase in economic insecurity and inequality;177 
and the decreasing ability of social insurance to provide an effective social 
safety net, as fewer people have secure jobs or stable personal 
relationships.178 
What no one has discussed, however, is the way that these elements 
contribute not just to increased family insecurity but also to a change in the 
dynamics of the entire system. The new system rewards those who manage 
the human capital investments necessary to achieve labor market nimbleness 
and family relationships based on flexibility, reciprocity, and trust—qualities 
beyond the reach of much of the population. Seeing the changes in these 
terms underscores the conclusion not just that the family wage system of the 
industrial era is gone, but also that it cannot be resurrected. Neither long-term 
employment nor marriage can work as a foundation for family security and 
stability in the information age; they have become markers of success rather 
than pathways to security. 
A. Women and the End of Dependence 
The move from an agrarian to an industrial economy did more than move 
men’s labor out of the homestead.179 It also commercialized domestic labor, 
as sewing, candle-making, and other women-identified activities moved into 
the market.180 The service economy that arose in the middle of the twentieth 
century accelerated the process.181 Women’s labor market participation 
started to grow in the fifties, with increased employer demand for services 
women have traditionally provided, and then grew steadily through the rest 
 
 177. Indeed, it has only been in the last few years that social scientists have begun to accept 
the relationship between the changing workplace and family organization. Compare WILSON, 
supra note 58, at 156 (denying the role of economics in cultural change), and CHARLES MURRAY, 
COMING APART: THE STATE OF WHITE AMERICA, 1960-2010, at 204–12 (2012) (attributing 
changes to the erosion of cultural values), with CHERLIN, supra note 117 passim, and David Autor, 
David Dorn & Gordon Hanson, When Work Disappears: Manufacturing Decline and the Falling 
Marriage Market Value of Young Men, 1 AM. ECON. REV. 161, 163 (2019) (observing that “a fall 
in the relative economic stature of men . . . reduces the prevalence of marriage” (emphasis 
omitted)). 
 178. See MAXINE EICHNER, THE FREE-MARKET FAMILY: HOW THE MARKET CRUSHED THE 
AMERICAN DREAM (AND HOW IT CAN BE RESTORED) (2020) (calling for an improved safety net); 
CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 110, at 101 (discussing how the role of employment instability 
exacerbates family tensions). 
 179. See Melvin Kranzberg & Michael T. Hannan, Women in the Workforce, BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/history-of-work-organization-648000/Women-in-the-
workforce [https://perma.cc/9N7G-7DNP]. 
 180. See id. 
 181. See id. 
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of the twentieth century in a reinforcing series of steps.182 Over the course of 
these developments, women gained relatively greater economic 
independence, resetting relationship terms.183 
The post-war economy increased market demand for women’s labor, 
starting with clerical work, then expanding to teachers needed to fill the 
classrooms of the baby boom generation, and eventually extending to a 
greater need for medical personnel with the expansion of health insurance.184 
With greater prosperity, women’s education increased, with the number of 
women attending college doubling in the sixties and increasing by another 
50% in the seventies.185 
By then, the Civil Rights and Women’s Movements had taken hold. The 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 outlawed sex discrimination.186 And the women’s 
movement secured greater reproductive rights, allowing women to postpone 
marriage and stay in school longer.187 As more women entered the workplace 
in the seventies and eighties, demand grew further for day care centers, 
restaurants, dry-cleaning establishments, and other service industries that met 
the needs of dual-income families.188 The growth in service sector jobs 
disproportionately increased the demand for women workers.189 And 
labor-saving devices (washing machines, dryers, and microwaves) made it 
 
 182. MITRA TOOSSI & TERESA L. MORISI, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., WOMEN IN THE 




 183. Between 1980 and 2000, the percentage of wives employed outside the home rose from 
58% to 75%. PAUL R. AMATO, ALAN BOOTH, DAVID R. JOHNSON & STACY J. ROGERS, ALONE 
TOGETHER: HOW MARRIAGE IN AMERICA IS CHANGING 101 (2007). 
 184. CARBONE, supra note 137, at 231 (noting increased demand for women’s market labor). 
 185. See JUNE CARBONE, NAOMI CAHN & NANCY LEVIT, SHAFTED: THE FATE OF WOMEN IN 
A WINNER-TAKE-ALL WORLD (forthcoming 2021) (on file with authors). 
 186. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. 
 187. Claudia Goldin & Lawrence F. Katz, The Power of the Pill: Oral Contraceptives and 
Women’s Career and Marriage Decisions, 110 J. POL. ECON. 730, 748–49 (2002) (linking 
women’s greater graduate school presence to the ability to postpone childbearing). 
 188. AMATO ET AL., supra note 183, at 123–24 (describing how dual-income families became 
better able “to afford services, such as high-quality child care, take-out meals, and home cleaning, 
that help to ease the family burdens associated with dual employment”). 
 189. Jim Tankersley, Shift to a Service-Driven Economy Delays Job Recovery, WASH. POST 
(May 3, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/shift-to-services-delays-job-
recovery/2013/05/03/a78ec0f0-b3f3-11e2-9a98-4be1688d7d84_story.html [https://perma.cc/
29KX-Z6PH]. “Goods production supplied about three-fifths of economic output in 1950 and 
about half of its jobs. By 2010, growth in the service sector has accounted for two-thirds of output 
and seven out of every 10 jobs.” Id.; see also CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 110, at 112 
(describing how women have benefitted from expansion of the service sector). 
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easier to deal with household tasks.190 By the end of the eighties, women’s 
increasing access to education won them access to the professional and 
managerial ranks.191 By the turn of the twenty-first century, women had 
become the better-educated sex, and in the early years of the twenty-first 
century, women’s labor force participation reached all-time highs, even 
though their wages still lagged behind men’s wages throughout the labor 
force.192 
Women’s economic progress undermined the male family wage system in 
three important ways. First, while men continued to earn more than women, 
women have won greater economic independence. As late as 1971, principles 
of coverture still limited a woman’s rights in marriage.193 By the end of the 
twentieth century, she was much more likely to have her own job, her own 
income and, if she wanted, control of her separate assets.194 This meant 
women had greater ability to leave an unhappy relationship if they chose.195 
With divorce reform and the pent-up divorce demand from the unusually 
young marriages of the fifties, divorce rates rose steadily from the seventies 
into the nineties.196 
Second, two-earner families have become more critical to family 
well-being. The stability of women’s employment steadily increased both 
compared to the days when women were forced to leave the labor force if 
they got pregnant197 and in comparison with the declining security in men’s 
 
 190. CARBONE, supra note 137, at 104 (describing the impact of fast-food restaurants and 
labor-saving devices). 
 191. CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 110, at 40–41. 
 192. See, e.g., Mary Beth Marklein, College Gender Gap Widens: 57% Are Women, USA 
TODAY (Oct. 19, 2005, 11:41 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/education/2005-10-19-
male-college-cover_x.htm [https://perma.cc/E7YW-AZND] (showing male and female 
representation on college campuses by race and income using data compiled by the National 
Center for Education Statistics); TOOSSI & MORISI, supra note 182, at 2 (showing trends in 
women’s labor force participation); CARBONE ET AL., supra note 185 (manuscript at 1–5). 
 193. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 674 (2015) (“One State’s law, for example, 
provided in 1971 that ‘the husband is the head of the family and the wife is subject to him; her 
legal civil existence is merged in the husband, except so far as the law recognizes her separately, 
either for her own protection, or for her benefit.’” (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 53–501 (1935)). 
 194. CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 110, at 40–41. 
 195. Id. at 114–16. 
 196. Sara McLanahan, Diverging Destinies: How Children Are Faring Under the Second 
Demographic Transition, 41 DEMOGRAPHY 607, 613–14 (2004) (showing steady increase in 
divorce rates into the nineties after which the rates diverge by class). 
 197. LYNDA LAUGHLIN, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MATERNITY LEAVE AND EMPLOYMENT 
PATTERNS OF FIRST-TIME MOTHERS: 1961–2008, at 3–4 (2011), 
https://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/p70-128.pdf [https://perma.cc/4R8N-6DCZ]. One of the 
reasons is that women are more likely to be employed in the public sector. Approximately 60% 
of employees in the state and local public sector (teachers, etc.) are women compared to about 
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employment over time.198 Yet trading off workforce participation and 
domestic responsibilities is more challenging than managing rigid gender 
roles, especially during periods of increased male income insecurity.199 
Third, the infrastructure necessary to support women’s workforce 
participation has yet to be fully institutionalized. Well-off women’s increased 
income pays for the labor-saving devices, cleaning crews, restaurant meals, 
and commercial childcare that make full-time workforce participation 
possible.200 These expenses—whether for high-quality day care centers or 
housekeeping crews—are often beyond the reach of the working class.201 
Working-class women, like the working-class women in factory jobs a 
century earlier, often find themselves in inflexible jobs that they do not 
particularly enjoy that take them away from home and children more than 
they would like.202 This in turn makes them more dependent on families and 
partners to fill in the gaps, which in turn increases relationship stress.203 
But the other change in family security depended on what was happening 
to men. The secure job paying a family wage was disappearing and that meant 
women’s market labor was becoming essential to family well-being for all 
but those at the very top of the economic scale.204 
B. Employees and the End of Loyalty 
Katherine Stone begins an article on the changing nature of employment 
with a description of a play depicting striking British miners in the Thatcher 
 
47% of employees in the private sector. David Cooper & Julia Wolfe, Cuts to the State and Local 
Public Sector Will Disproportionately Harm Women and Black Workers, ECON. POL’Y INST.: 
WORKING ECON. BLOG (July 9, 2020, 4:58 PM), https://www.epi.org/blog/cuts-to-the-state-and-
local-public-sector-will-disproportionately-harm-women-and-black-workers/ [https://perma.cc/
5M5U-WLRN]. African-Americans are also more likely to work in the public sector. Id. And 
public-sector jobs have become more unionized. Press Release, U.S. Bureau of Lab. Stat., Union 
Membership (Annual) News Release (Jan. 22, 2021, 10:00 AM), 
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.htm [https://perma.cc/VR8N-MFAC]. Indeed, 
public-sector unions have five times the membership rate of private-sector unions. Id. 
 198. Stone, supra note 99, 544–48, 574 (summarizing evidence that shows declining job 
tenure and concluding that it understates the increased precarity of employment). 
 199. AMATO ET AL., supra note 183, at 123–24 (describing how working-class women’s need 
to work to compensate for their partners’ declining fortunes has led to increased marital tensions 
and divorce proneness). 
 200. Id. (describing how the income better-educated women contributed to their families 
often went to hiring cleaning services or restaurant means). 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at 124 (describing increase in marital tensions by class). 
 203. Id. at 122. 
 204. Id. at 123–24. 
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era.205 She writes about how the play portrays the end of the nineteenth and 
twentieth century workers’ world, with “notions of community, solidarity, 
and manhood” giving way to “a new world of individual expression, personal 
risk, and opportunity.”206 In the new world, employment security 
disappears.207 New opportunities emerge for those positioned to take 
advantage of them.208 But risks increase, and corporatized social insurance 
does not address the new uncertainties.209 In the new world of the information 
age, “knowledge workers, entrepreneurs, free agents, and laboring drifters 
move about in diffuse networks, working on projects, delinked from stable 
employing institutions.”210 
Four key changes explain the new era. First, automation has reduced the 
need for manual labor.211 Large industrialization-era organizations like Ford 
Motor Company or U.S. Steel once employed large labor forces to perform 
routine tasks.212 Today, much of that production has been mechanized, 
reducing labor demand.213 Second, globalization has made it easier to shift 
production abroad, with large corporations moving factories to countries with 
lower labor costs.214 This contributes to the erosion of blue-collar wages in 
the United States.215 Third, legal changes and deunionization have made it 
easier to outsource jobs, not just abroad, but also to the janitorial company 
 
 205. Katherine V.W. Stone, Rupture and Invention: The Changing Nature of Work and the 
Implications for Social Policy, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF U.S. LABOR LAW FOR THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 154, 154–55 (Richard Bales & Charlotte Garden eds., 2020). 
 206. Id. at 155. 
 207. Id. at 159–60. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. at 155. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Claire Cain Miller, The Long-Term Jobs Killer Is Not China. It’s Automation, N.Y. 
TIMES: THE UPSHOT (Dec. 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/21/upshot/the-long-
term-jobs-killer-is-not-china-its-automation.html [https://perma.cc/V259-C7TN]; ANDREW 
YANG, THE WAR ON NORMAL PEOPLE: THE TRUTH ABOUT AMERICA’S DISAPPEARING JOBS AND 
WHY UNIVERSAL BASIC INCOME IS OUR FUTURE, at xiii–xiv (2018). 
 212. Stone, supra note 99, at 527–28, 531–33. 
 213. YANG, supra note 211, at 36–40; Miller, supra note 211 (summarizing academic 
literature and concluding that automation is a bigger factor than trade in explaining loss of 
manufacturing jobs); see also Richard Baldwin, White-Collar Robots Are Coming for Jobs, WALL 
ST. J. (Jan. 31, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/white-collar-robots-are-coming-
for-jobs-11548939601 [https://perma.cc/W5XG-2FJM] (describing new round of automation 
affecting white-collar employees). 
 214. Katherine V.W. Stone, Globalization and the Middle Class 2, 21–22 (Univ. Cal. L.A. 
Sch. of L., Research Paper No. 12-16, 2012), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2150412 
[https://perma.cc/TJ5W-U56L]. 
 215. Id. at 2 (arguing that the price of labor in China may affect what American workers can 
bargain for). 
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down the street.216 A company janitor at General Motors often enjoyed the 
same health and pensions benefits as other employees; a janitor with a small 
business typically enjoys lower pay, less job security, and fewer benefits.217 
Finally, the combination of technological innovation, financialization, and 
short-term focused corporate objectives have increased the rate of change.218 
The corporations that dominated the national landscape in 1910 were largely 
the same corporations that did so in the sixties, and they tended to be 
companies that either benefitted from economies of scale and barriers to entry 
(steel, autos) or that served regulated markets (energy, communications).219 
The largest firms today, in contrast, involve a more varied and rotating mix 
of financial (Berkshire-Hathaway), tech (Apple), and retail (Walmart) giants 
in addition to some of the surviving energy and auto companies.220 Moreover, 
while tech appears to be the biggest winner, it employs substantially fewer 
workers than manufacturing and retail did at their height.221 These companies 
depend to a greater degree on skilled workers who can navigate the 
companies’ changing needs in competitive global markets.222 
These changes substantially alter the employment relationship. Katherine 
Stone has described the result as a new “psychological contract,” in which 
both the company and the worker “have lower expectations for long-term 
employment, employees are responsible for their own career development, 
 
 216. Timothy P. Glynn, Taking the Employer Out of Employment Law? Accountability for 
Wage and Hour Violations in an Age of Enterprise Disaggregation, 15 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y 
J. 201, 212–13 (2011) (“While a large or medium-size firm in the middle of the twentieth century 
might have produced its own component parts and other inputs, and provided its own janitorial, 
maintenance, copying, printing, food, delivery, distribution, and storage services, these tasks now 
have been shifted to independent firms, sometimes through multiple intermediaries or supply 
chains. . . . [and] outsourcing production overseas and domestically is standard practice.”); see 
also DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE 8–10 (2014) (arguing that the fissured workplace 
involves transferring all of a business’s non-core activities to other entities); David Weil, 
Understanding the Present and Future of Work in the Fissured Workplace Context, 5 RSF 147, 
148 (2019). 
 217. Stone, supra note 205, at 158–59, 161 (describing outsourcing not just of cleaning needs 
but also bookkeeping and accounting, and describing the use of “phony ‘independent 
contractors’” to perform janitorial services). 
 218. Stone, supra note 99, at 531–35, 549 (noting the pressure for “short-term cost reduction” 
and the resulting changes in production). 
 219. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 92–94, 118–19 (1967). 
 220. Fortune 500, FORTUNE (2020), http://fortune.com/fortune500/ [https://perma.cc/4S2Z-
TJJF]. Walmart is number one; Amazon (a combination of tech and retail) is number two. Id. 
 221. DAVIS, supra note 17, at 92 (discussing relatively low numbers of employees in 
tech-dominated corporations). 
 222. See Stone, supra note 205, at 161. 
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and commitment to the work has replaced commitment to the job and 
organization.”223 Others refer to it as the “casualization” of employment.224 
These new employment terms have different implications for the skilled 
and the unskilled. “The ambitious see many positions as stepping stones in a 
personal saga rather than as a source of commitment.”225 For them, 
“employability security” has replaced “employment security.”226 Those with 
the best opportunities acquire the right degrees, going back to school if 
necessary.227 They seek experience, often starting with unpaid internships.228 
They switch jobs—and often cities—as opportunities arise.229 In accordance 
with the implicit terms of this psychological contract, neither employer nor 
employee is loyal to the other.230 
For unskilled workers, these changes mean that there may be neither 
security nor opportunity. Blue-collar industrial jobs often required little skill 
outside of company-specific training.231 When these factories close, the 
workers have few options that pay as well.232 By the nineties, retail firms (and 
McDonald’s) had eclipsed manufacturing as the biggest employers.233 
Companies like Walmart are willing to hire those without skill or experience, 
but Walmart pays its hourly workers little more than the minimum wage with 
 
 223. Stone, supra note 99, at 552 (quoting Marcie A. Cavanaugh & Raymond A. Noe, 
Antecedents and Consequences of Relational Components of the New Psychological Contract, 20 
J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 323, 324 (1999)). 
 224. See LUC BOLTANSKI & ÈVE CHIAPELLO, THE NEW SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 224 (Gregory 
Elliott trans., 2007). 
 225. June Carbone & Nancy Levit, The Death of the Firm, 101 MINN. L. REV. 963, 1009 
(2017); BOLTANKSI & CHIAPELLO, supra note 224, at 93 (observing that acquisition of experience 
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 226. Stone, supra note 99, at 525. 
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ones that have been lost). 
 233. See Lauren Weber, Some of the World’s Largest Employers No Longer Sell Things, They 
Rent Workers, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 28, 2017, 11:46 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/some-of-
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perma.cc/2VHD-6A4G]; Alexander E.M. Hess, The 10 Largest Employers in America, USA 
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https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/08/22/ten-largest-employers/2680249/ 
[https://perma.cc/95RU-GJQW]. 
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few benefits or opportunities for advancement.234 Finally, independent 
contractors, gig workers,235 and temp agencies236 provide a variety of 
employment opportunities that fill in the gaps left by other forms of 
employment. While they provide some workers greater control of working 
hours and conditions, they typically require that workers acquire skills on 
their own and provide little in the way of social insurance or benefits.237 
C. Employability and Family Strategies 
The upwardly mobile middle class responded to these changes, just as the 
upwardly mobile middle class of the industrial era did: with a new family 
strategy. As we have written elsewhere, this strategy involves investment in 
women’s as well as men’s income capacity, postponing family formation 
until after a couple achieves emotional maturity and financial independence, 
and the remaking of relationship terms to emphasize mutual respect and 
shared decision-making.238 The changed relationship between partners 
contributes to a family’s ability to realize “employability security” rather than 
“employment security.”239 Mature adults (in this system) have completed 
their formal education, worked through the internships and job changes that 
give them marketable skills, and acquired the cushion in terms and income 
and flexibility necessary to be able to trade-off responsibilities with a partner. 
This new strategy provides a measure of family security—on terms beyond 
the reach of a good part of the population. 
 
 234. Nelson Lichtenstein, Wal-Mart: A Template for Twenty-First-Century Capitalism, in 
WAL-MART: THE FACE OF TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY CAPITALISM 3, 21 (Nelson Lichtenstein ed., 
2006). 
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OF U.S. HOUSEHOLDS IN 2018, at 18 (2019), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2018-report-economic-well-being-us-
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 236. See, e.g., ERIN HATTON, THE TEMP ECONOMY 1–2 (2011) (documenting the rise of the 
temp economy); Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, From Amazon to Uber: Defining Employment in 
the Modern Economy, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1673, 1676 (2016) (discussing the lack of protection for 
temp workers and independent contractors). 
 237. See Stone, supra note 205, at 160–61; HATTON, supra note 236, at 1–2. 
 238. See, e.g., CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 110, at 117–18 (describing new marital script); 
NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE, RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES 1–2 (2010) (showing 
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ELITE 30 (2019) (documenting how the loss of middle-class jobs results in lower marriage rates). 
 239. Stone, supra note 99, at 525. 
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The legal regulation of marriage reinforces this strategy.240 The changed 
marital terms are egalitarian in form as they assume a partnership with equal 
contributions. At divorce, the couple’s assets are equally divided, and shared 
parenting has become the norm.241 For couples in unequal, unhappy, unfair, 
or unstable relationships, however, legal commitments may undermine 
security.242 
To explain why, it is useful to consider the economics of risk management. 
That analysis posits that business enterprises with high-income volatility 
require a larger capital base to survive.243 The reason is that most businesses, 
like most families, have fixed expenses. If revenues plunge, even temporarily, 
the entity may be forced to default on its payments, triggering evictions, 
collection actions, or bankruptcy.244 Families are no different.245 A Federal 
Reserve Report indicated that close to 40% of Americans would have 
difficulty paying an unexpected bill of $400.246 According to the same report, 
30% of American adults have income that varies from month to month, and 
a quarter of adults under the age of thirty receive financial assistance from 
someone outside of their household, typically parents.247 Many couples, 
particularly young couples, have no cushion to weather unexpected expenses 
or income losses.248 
 
 240. See CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 110, at 111–17 (describing the emergence of “see-
saw” marriages in which couples trade off work and family obligations as circumstances change 
and corresponding legal changes). 
 241. See June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Nonmarriage, 76 MD. L. REV. 55, 85–87 (2016) 
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benefits, and changes in household income caused by changes in household structure”). 
 246. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., supra note 235, at 2. 
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Instability thus destabilizes working-class families. While better-off 
couples may have the resources to respond to a job loss by going back to 
school or taking a lower-paying job that supplies new skills, working-class 
men have more difficulty recovering financially,249 and layoffs often 
exacerbate substance abuse, violence, and other behavioral issues.250 Even 
without such issues, many individuals are reluctant to commit to a partner 
who is not financially stable for fear that the relationship will deplete their 
own resources.251 
Practically this means that while marriage is a source of strength for 
couples who can trade off childcare and workforce participation in ways that 
allow the family to marshal the resources necessary for investment in children 
and in adult “employability,” it can be a threat to working-class families.252 
It also means that the working class has little ability to form families on 
middle-class terms, and that marriage without those terms does not and 
cannot serve as the foundation for family security and stability.253 
* * * 
 
52 DEMOGRAPHY 455, 473 (2015) (finding income instability to be nearly double in the lowest 
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(describing a young woman who explains that being with the father of her child “would just mean 
one less granola bar for the two of us.”). 
 253. For a description of these marriage/nonmarriage dynamics, see id. at 118–22 (describing 
wariness about sharing principles); June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, The Triple System of Family 
Law, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1185; Naomi Cahn & June Carbone, Blackstonian Marriage, 
Gender, and Cohabitation, 51 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1247 (2019). 
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These changes act together to dismantle the family wage system of the 
industrial era. The new organizational regime prizes high degrees of 
flexibility, which in turn depend on network-based organization and human 
capital investment.254 The upwardly mobile middle class has redesigned its 
family strategy to facilitate greater flexibility and investment.255 The benefits 
of this system are beyond the reach of the working class. They lack access to 
the good jobs of the new economy, and without income stability or a capital 
cushion, they lack access to the “see-saw” relationships that hedge against 
risk and provide a cushion in the new era.256 Social insurance tied to specific 
employers and marriage does not reach them at all. It is time to rethink the 
terms of family—and societal—stability and security. 
III. UNCOUPLING AND THE REDESIGN OF FAMILY SECURITY AND 
STABILITY 
At the height of the industrial era, society provided for family security and 
stability through three interlocking mechanisms. First, large industrial 
organizations secured a stable workforce by providing relatively secure 
employment at above-market wages257 to a reliable workforce groomed to 
meet their needs.258 Second, the male family wage extended the benefits of 
that system in ways that reinforced breadwinner identification with 
employment as a source of status and meaning,259 with a husband’s income 
affecting whether a wife worked.260 Third, the New Deal architects designed 
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a social insurance system that filled in the gaps of this system while 
disguising the role of the state in doing so.261 Unionization, particularly in the 
era following World War II, helped to reset labor markets in ways that raised 
blue-collar wages outside the ranks of the unionized, and social insurance 
programs such as Social Security largely eliminated poverty among seniors 
through a system that depended more on redistribution than the narrow 
definitions of desert used to justify the program.262 The system, in short, 
depended on large, dominant corporate institutions that acted in concert with 
an active governmental role and the institutionalization of worker interests.263 
The design of a new system must similarly complement the redesign of 
employment and family. Large corporate entities have become much more 
network-like in their organization. They routinely prune workforces and 
replace them with independent contractors, temporary workers, or new 
affiliates.264 They invest less in worker training while giving individual 
employees greater authority in ways that enhance their experience, skills, and 
ultimate employability.265 They have shifted pension benefits from defined 
benefit systems guaranteeing workers’ retirement income to more portable, 
defined contribution systems that transfer the risk of market losses to the 
workers. In short, the companies benefit from deregulation and the 
destruction of union power, giving them much greater flexibility—and 
increasing individual insecurity and family instability.266 
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AYRQ] (charting the rise of temporary workers from 1990 to 2020); Stone, supra note 99, at 
561–62 (observing that globalization has to focus on adaptability). 
 265. BOLTANSKI & CHIAPELLO, supra note 224, at 93 (observing that workers value 
experience that enhances employability more than employment security in the new era). 
 266. SMITH-RAMANI ET AL., supra note 244, at 4–6 (describing increase in family instability 
and attributing it changes in work, benefits, and family structure). 
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The challenge, therefore, for a new system of family security and stability 
is how to protect individuals in this new environment. Unlike the old system, 
the new one can no longer depend on long-term employment, nor on the 
breadwinner–homemaker families that have become obsolete in the new era. 
The system must accordingly become more individualized; it must be 
uncoupled from employment and from marriage. In many ways, the 
transformation is already well underway. The most critical issue, however, is 
whether the state role will continue to be disguised or whether it will come 
out into the open as a critical component of family security and stability. 
A. Uncoupling Benefits from Marriage: The Beginning 
The prerequisite for individual financial security has become 
“employability;” that is, acquisition of the education, skills, and experience 
necessary to become marketable in a competitive labor pool.267 The 
partnership ideal in the information age has become two adults with the 
flexibility, maturity, and trust necessary to trade off work, childcare, and 
other family tasks in ways that reflect shared decision-making.268 Marriage 
without employability (or without trust) is unlikely to provide security and 
stability.269 This ideal today is beyond the reach of a good part of the 
population.270 Consequently, tying benefits to marriage simply increases 
economic inequality in punitive and counterproductive ways. 
To a large degree, American law already reflects this change in the 
institution of marriage. The Supreme Court, as early as the 1970s, recognized 
the elements of the new middle-class marriage system, which depends on 
women’s reproductive autonomy and more egalitarian marital 
relationships.271 And in 2015, the Supreme Court embraced a modern 
marriage model shorn of its gendered attributes in extending marriage 
equality to same-sex couples.272 What has yet to happen is the emergence of 
a state role extending the benefits of this system to the population as a whole, 
decoupling benefits from relationships. 
 
 267. Stone, supra note 99, at 552–53 (describing change from “employment security” to 
“employability security”). 
 268. CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 110, at 113–14. 
 269. See supra Part II.C; CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 110, at 101 (discussing the 
relationship between economic security and marriage). 
 270. These developments parallel the changes with the Industrial Revolution, which also 
produced class-based differences in family strategies. See, e.g., RYAN, supra note 64, at 184–85 
(describing class-based differences to industrialization). 
 271. For a summary of the changes, see CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 110, at 111–13 
(describing new marital script). 
 272. See discussion of Obergefell v. Hodges, infra notes 305–329 and accompanying text. 
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The Supreme Court, when squarely presented with the issue of punitive 
distinctions based on marriage, has agreed that they are pointless. In Levy v. 
Louisiana, for example, the Supreme Court struck down distinctions between 
marital and nonmarital children’s ability to bring a wrongful death action.273 
The Court observed: 
Why should the illegitimate child be denied rights merely because 
of his birth out of wedlock? He certainly is subject to all the 
responsibilities of a citizen, including the payment of taxes and 
conscription under the Selective Service Act. How under our 
constitutional regime can he be denied correlative rights which 
other citizens enjoy?274 
The Court was even more direct in Eisenstadt v. Baird.275 In this case, the 
Court considered a challenge to a Massachusetts statute that prohibited 
unmarried persons’ contraceptive use.276 Seven years earlier, the Court had 
recognized a constitutional right to privacy, permitting married couples 
access to contraception.277 While Massachusetts argued that unmarried 
individuals did not enjoy the same expectation of sexual privacy, the Court 
relied on the Equal Protection Clause to find that a married couple was “not 
an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of 
two individuals.”278 Each individual, not each married couple, enjoyed the 
right to privacy.279 
These opinions laid the foundation for a new legal approach to marriage, 
one that no longer treated marriage as mandatory and placed less weight on 
it as a bright-line distinction for the allocation of rights. In this context, 
sexuality did not always have to coincide with marriage,280 and preventing 
 
 273. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968). 
 274. Id. For a thorough review of the Supreme Court’s treatment of the legitimacy cases and 
their emphasis on harm to “innocent children,” see Serena Mayeri, Marital Supremacy and the 
Constitution of the Nonmarital Family, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 1277, 1290 (2015). 
 275. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). 
 276. Id. at 440. 
 277. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (holding that a ban on 
contraceptive access to married couples was unconstitutional as a violation of the right to 
privacy); Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 (establishing the same right for unmarried couples seven 
years later). 
 278. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453. The Court used the term “invidious” to describe the 
distinction, and also referred to an “arbitrary and unreasonable government,” suggesting that the 
standard is close to rational basis. Id. at 454. 
 279. Melissa Murray, Obergefell v. Hodges and Nonmarriage Inequality, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 
1207, 1225 (2016). 
 280. During this same period, the shotgun marriage, which has served as the fall back 
channeling pregnancy into marriage, was also fading. See George A. Akerlof, Janet L. Yellen & 
Michael L. Katz, An Analysis of Out-of-Wedlock Childbearing in the United States, 111 Q.J. 
ECON. 277, 278 (1996). 
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the distribution of contraception to single women became pointless and cruel. 
The Eisenstadt Court, in applying the Due Process clause, explained that: “It 
would be plainly unreasonable to assume that Massachusetts has prescribed 
pregnancy and the birth of an unwanted child [or the physical and 
psychological dangers of an abortion] as punishment for fornication.”281 The 
Court employed the same reasoning to hold a few years later that the right to 
privacy did not permit New York to prohibit the sale or distribution of 
contraceptives to individuals under the age of sixteen.282 The Court reiterated 
that it was inappropriate to attempt to channel sexuality into marriage by 
making the birth of a child the penalty, and it doubted in any event whether 
deterrence worked.283 Linking substantial benefits to a desire to promote 
marriage, when it results in hardship to substantial parts of the population, 
should be seen as similarly irrational.284 The Supreme Court in the seventies 
nonetheless did not find a state obligation to treat married and unmarried 
couples equally285 nor did it find an affirmative obligation to extend benefits 
to the unmarried.286 In a 5-4 decision in 1979, for example, the Supreme Court 
continued to interpret Social Security survivors’ benefits solely as a 
replacement for a wage-earner’s income that allowed married mothers to stay 
out of the labor market.287 
B. Uncoupling Benefits from Marriage: Round 2 
The much more dramatic redefinition of the state role came with the 
congressional dismantling of ADC in the nineties. The statutory changes, 
while ironically done in the name of marriage promotion, constitute a major 
 
 281. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 448. The Court also expressed skepticism about whether it 
worked. Id. 
 282. Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 695 (1977). 
 283. Id. 
 284. See Courtney G. Joslin, Discrimination In and Out of Marriage, 98 B.U. L. Rev. 1, 2 
(2018) (arguing for the dismantling of distinctions based on marriage); Kaiponanea T. 
Matsumura, A Right Not To Marry, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1509, 1545–47 (2016) (noting that not 
every law that incentivizes or deters marriage is unconstitutional). 
 285. See Mayeri, supra note 274, at 1352 (concluding that the cases stopped short of 
recognizing the link between “marital supremacy” and the “battle for racial, sexual, and economic 
justice”). 
 286. See id. at 1337 (describing how the Court distinguished between provisions that made 
children ineligible for benefits because their parents were unmarried, thereby punishing the 
children for “illegitimacy” versus provisions for adults premised on the loss of access to a wage-
earner’s support, where “marriage could be used as a shorthand for dependency” on the lost 
income). 
 287. Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282, 293 (1979). The Court ruled that “Congress could 
reasonably conclude that a woman who has never been married to the wage earner is far less likely 
to be dependent upon the wage earner at the time of his death.” Id. at 289. 
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part of the uncoupling from marriage. The New Deal legislation of the thirties 
had rejected universal child allowances in favor of the means-tested program, 
known in the nineties as Aid for Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC).288 Once women gained access to the workforce, however, it no 
longer made sense to treat women as intrinsically dependent solely because 
of motherhood, and President Bill Clinton vowed “to end welfare as we know 
it.”289 In 1996, Congress replaced the program with the Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program.290 
TANF, however, rested on a fundamental contradiction.291 Two of its four 
objectives were tied to marriage, treating marriage promotion and the 
prevention of nonmarital births as primary objectives.292 Yet, most of its focus 
involved its second objective: getting single mothers off the welfare rolls and 
into paid employment,293 rejecting the premise that only men could earn 
enough to support a family.294 TANF used punitive measures, limiting the 
duration and nature of benefits, as a principal means of accomplishing its 
ends.295 The idea of “responsible motherhood” had shifted from procreation 
within marriage to not having more children than you could support without 
government assistance.296 
 
 288. See CARBONE, supra note 137, at 200–01 (describing how these programs were shaped 
to prioritize assistance to widows and exclude African-Americans and immigrants); Alberto 
Alesina, Edward Glaeser & Bruce Sacerdote, Why Doesn’t the United States Have a 
European-Style Welfare State?, 2001 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 187, 195 tbl.4 
(emphasizing that as far back as 1870, the United States has had lower public welfare benefits 
than European countries). 
 289. See CARBONE, supra note 137, at 205–07 (observing that welfare reform “was fought 
on the battleground of permissible motherhood” and that the Act was named the “Personal 
Responsibility Act”). 
 290. See Andrew Hammond, Welfare and Federalism’s Peril, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1721, 1770 
(2017) (describing program). 
 291. Mayeri, supra note 274, at 1337–38 (addressing differential treatment of nonmarital 
parents). 
 292. 42 U.S.C. § 601(a). 
 293. The purpose section of TANF explicitly includes “end[ing] the dependence of needy 
parents on government benefits by promoting job preparation, work, and marriage.” Id. § 
601(a)(2). 
 294. See Eichner, supra note 78, at 257 (stating that TANF required mothers to work in paid 
jobs in order to receive government aid). 
 295. See Hammond, supra note 290, at 1730 (observing that most state-level changes 
“involved increased uses of sanctions, the introduction of family caps, and other means by which 
to push recipients off the welfare rolls, all of which would reduce expenditures.”). 
 296. Eichner, supra note 78, at 257 (treating the adoption of TANF as the triumph of 
neoliberal ideology). 
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The real import of the shift from AFDC to TANF became the elimination 
of cash payments to needy families as an entitlement.297 That means that not 
all of those who qualify receive benefits, and even those who remain enrolled 
do not necessarily receive the promised assistance.298 And, unsurprisingly, it 
has had almost no effect on what was supposed to be the program’s central 
purpose—increasing marriage rates.299 
In eliminating AFDC, Congress did recognize, however, that employment 
alone might not be sufficient to meet the needs of poor families. To make it 
possible for poor mothers to work and support their families, Congress took 
three additional steps that provided benefits that were not premised, as AFDC 
had been, on compensation for the absence of a wage-earner. It expanded 
health care eligibility,300 the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC),301 and food 
stamps.302 While eligibility for these programs often involves restrictive 
requirements and while recipients have sometimes been maligned,303 the 
programs recognize a new basis for benefits: the idea that employability 
requires at least minimum access to food and medicine and that the market 
does not necessarily permit all families to be self-sufficient, given the relative 
decline in blue-collar wages and employment security.304 
 
 297. See Hammond, supra note 290, at 1732 (describing a major consequence of the 
enactment of TANF as “the elimination of the entitlement”). 
 298. Id. 
 299. See, e.g., CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 110, at 14–20 (summarizing class-based 
changes in family formation); see also Sara Sternberg Greene, The Bootstrap Trap, 67 DUKE L.J. 
233, 233 (2017) (observing that the “parents who have most internalized narratives of 
self-sufficiency are particularly at risk of financial ruin under the new regime”). 
 300. Before passage of the ACA, Medicaid “covered only pregnant women, some parents 
with dependent children, seniors in long-term care, and low-income individuals with disabilities.” 
Gluck & Scott-Railton, supra note 13, at 509–10. 
 301. See Anne L. Alstott, Why the EITC Doesn’t Make Work Pay, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 285, 285 (2010) (describing the EITC as the “largest cash-transfer program for 
low-income workers with children”). The EITC, however, benefits only those parents who have 
paid jobs. Greene, supra note 299, at 237 n.11. 
 302. See Michael W. Long et al., Public Support for Policies To Improve the Nutritional 
Impact of the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), 17 PUB. HEALTH 
NUTRITION 219, 220 (2012) (“Seventy-seven per cent of [those polled] believed that federal 
spending on SNAP should be increased (48%) or maintained (29%) . . . .”). 
 303. The notion of “deserving poor” has been carried through to Medicaid. See Nicole 
Huberfeld & Jessica L. Roberts, Health Care and the Myth of Self-Reliance, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1, 
12 (2016); Dayna B. Matthew, Justice and the Struggle for the Soul of Medicaid, 13 ST. LOUIS U. 
J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 29, 31 (2019). 
 304. See, e.g., Greg M. Shaw, Changes in Public Opinion and the American Welfare State, 
124 POL. SCI. Q. 627, 634–35 (2009) (noting that programs that benefit children and the elderly 
or that provide in-kind assistance, such as food stamps or medical care, enjoy more support than 
need-based cash assistance). 
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Completing the process of decoupling from marriage is a fundamental 
redefinition of the institution’s purpose and significance. 
In Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme Court’s embrace of marriage 
equality did pay homage to the continuing importance of marriage,305 but the 
opinion affirms a model that makes marriage a voluntary act of individual 
self-expression.306 Justice Kennedy’s opinion described four principles 
underlying recognition of a constitutional right to marry.307 The first two 
involve personal self-definition.308 He argued that a right to “marriage is 
inherent in the concept of individual autonomy”309 and that the right to marry 
is “fundamental because it supports a two-person union unlike any other in 
its importance to the committed individuals.”310 These first two principles do 
not involve an obligation to marry or a definition of marriage tied to its role 
in providing economic security and stability. 
The last two principles involve the benefits that come from public 
recognition of a couple’s marital status.311 Yet, the second two principles, 
which treat marriage as fundamentally important to the societal order, are in 
many ways in tension with the first two. If marriage is a critical part of 
self-definition, then it should, by definition, be optional: not all individuals, 
or couples, will choose to define themselves in terms of marriage.312 The 
majority opinion clearly rejected the notion that the principal importance of 
marriage lies with its connection to heterosexual procreation,313 but it did not 
convincingly address the question of why marriage should remain 
foundational to the social order—and therefore “fundamental” as a matter or 
right—at all. 
 
 305. For criticism of the case in these terms, see Murray, supra note 279, at 1249, 1252 
(arguing that the Court’s praise of marriage will encourage lower courts to interpret statutory 
terms like “family” or “kinship” narrowly to require marriage rather than broadly to include 
nonmarital families). 
 306. Some refer to this as “capstone” marriage, suggesting that it serves as a celebration of 
the couple’s success. We dislike the term because it obscures the family strategies that make 
human capital investment the necessary precondition to stable and secure relationships. See supra 
Part II.C. 
 307. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 646–48 (2015). 
 308. Id. at 646–47. 
 309. Id. at 665, 666 (observing further that marriage decisions are “among the most intimate 
that an individual can make”). 
 310. Id. 
 311. Id. at 669 (“[M]arriage is ‘the foundation of the family and of society, without which 
there would be neither civilization nor progress.’” (quoting Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 
(1888))). 
 312. Cf. id. at 646 (linking marriage to childrearing). 
 313. Id. at 669 (“[T]he right to marry is less meaningful for those who do not or cannot have 
children.”). 
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Justice Kennedy’s third principle, describing the importance of marriage 
for childrearing, underscores the fact that parental connection to children, 
rather than marriage itself, has become the defining feature of family life. His 
opinion stated that “[w]ithout the recognition, stability, and predictability 
marriage offers, their children suffer the stigma of knowing their families are 
somehow lesser.”314 Presumably, what Justice Kennedy had in mind when he 
referred to predictability is the difficulty unmarried couples have had in 
gaining legal recognition of their parental status.315 One of the couples in the 
Obergefell litigation, for example, consisted of two women raising children 
together in Michigan.316 Michigan permitted only married couples or single 
individuals to adopt.317 Since the two women could not marry, their children 
each had only one legal parent.318 Justice Kennedy explained that, if tragedy 
were to befall either partner, “the other would have no legal rights over the 
children she had not been permitted to adopt.”319 This couple, in bringing the 
case, sought “relief from the continuing uncertainty their unmarried status 
creates in their lives.”320 It is clearly accurate to say that the lack of legal 
recognition of their parental status complicates their children’s lives, but that 
does not answer the question why it is marriage, rather than parental 
recognition, that constitutes the problem.321 
Justice Kennedy emphasizes in the second half of the sentence that 
children are also harmed by the stigma that comes from the denial of their 
parents’ ability to marry, particularly where that denial reflects disapproval 
 
 314. Id. at 668. 
 315. The opinion, in referring to unpredictability and instability, mentioned marriage-related 
benefits such as  
taxation; inheritance and property rights; rules of intestate succession; spousal 
privilege in the law of evidence; hospital access; medical decisionmaking 
authority; adoption rights; the rights and benefits of survivors; birth and death 
certificates; professional ethics rules; campaign finance restrictions; workers’ 
compensation benefits; health insurance; and child custody, support, and 
visitation rules. 
Id. at 670. Some of these rights, such as intestate succession, can be addressed through 
wills or other forms of contract, but parenthood cannot be. Id. 
 316. Id. at 658. 
 317. Id. at 658–59. 
 318. Id. at 659. 
 319. Id. 
 320. Id. The unpredictability argument, however, at least as it relates to marriage, is circular. 
It maintains that since the couple cannot marry, they cannot acquire legal recognition as parents 
of each other’s children, and that lack of legal recognition creates harmful uncertainty for their 
children; therefore, they should be allowed to marry. 
 321. See, e.g., Douglas NeJaime, The Constitution of Parenthood, 72 STAN. L. REV. 261, 269 
(2020). 
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of the parents’ relationship with each other.322 This argument is more 
compelling. Nonetheless, if it is the differential treatment that causes the 
stigma, this is a classic equal protection argument, resting on the 
discriminatory denial of access to a state-sanctioned status rather than a due 
process argument resting on the fundamental importance of the status itself.323 
The fourth principle Justice Kennedy articulates is similarly unpersuasive. 
It refers to the role of marriage as “a keystone of the Nation’s social order.”324 
The majority makes no effort to explain why marriage should still be seen as 
such a keystone. Instead, the opinion again invokes equal protection analysis 
to state that “it is demeaning to lock same-sex couples out of a central 
institution of the Nation’s society, for they too may aspire to the transcendent 
purposes of marriage.”325 The harm the Court identifies from being denied 
access is dignitary;326 it comes from the societal judgment that the unions 
same-sex couples form are somehow lesser and therefore stigmatized. The 
value Obergefell associates with the institution of marriage comes from its 
“transcendent purposes,” i.e., from its dynamic allowing “two people to find 
a life that could not be found alone, for a marriage becomes greater than just 
the two persons.”327 
In short, Obergefell’s ode to marriage, which scholars have read to 
denigrate the standing of those who do not marry, celebrates marriage’s 
importance as an expression of the couple’s commitment to each other and 
the harm that comes from the denial of an equal right to recognition for 
same-sex couples. 
The meaning of marriage within the family wage tradition was quite 
different. That had what James Q. Wilson refers to as “the authority of 
marriage” tied to a command that one must marry in order to merit societal 
support for the childrearing project, based on an assumption of women and 
 
 322. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 660 (referring to condemnation of same-sex intimacy “as 
immoral by the state itself in most Western nations” through the middle of the twentieth century). 
 323. For an examination of this debate, see Gregg Strauss, What’s Wrong with Obergefell, 
40 CARDOZO L. REV. 631, 633–34 (2018) (describing the argument that in order to justify a 
positive right to marry, the Obergefell opinion “waded into debates about the nature 
of marriage that it could have avoided with equality analysis”). 
 324. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 646. As Serena Mayeri notes in her exploration of nonmarital 
parenthood, the Court does not “question the superiority of marital families.” Serena 
Mayeri, Foundling Fathers: (Non-)marriage and Parental Rights in the Age of Equality, 125 
YALE L.J. 2292, 2392 (2016). 
 325. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 647. 
 326. Id. at 666 (“There is dignity in the bond between two men or two women who seek to 
marry and in their autonomy to make such profound choices.”). 
 327. Id. at 647, 657. 
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children’s intrinsic dependence.328 Instead, what Obergefell recognized is that 
marriage has become a means to express love and commitment by those in a 
position to make a meaningful choice about how they wish to live their 
lives.329 
This jurisprudence, much like the Supreme Court’s decision in Muller v. 
Oregon a century earlier, embraces what has become the middle-class family 
ideal. In the Muller time period, that family ideal was a breadwinner husband 
supporting a dependent wife; today, the middle-class model involves an 
egalitarian romantic ideal. What none of these developments address is how 
the elements that allow couples to reach the point of self-definition have been 
placed beyond the reach of a large part of the population. The Supreme 
Court’s decisions from Griswold to Carey, for example, while striking down 
prohibitions on the sale and distribution of contraception, did nothing to 
ensure that access would be available.330 The result has been a “dual system” 
of contraceptive access;331 those who enjoy family security have far more 
access than those who do not, in large part because of employer-provided 
(and taxpayer-subsidized) health insurance.332 Yet, contraceptive access does 
more to promote self-definition than the decision in Obergefell, which 
 
 328. WILSON, supra note 58, at 217. “[B]y bestowing a respected status and material benefits 
on married couples, society encourages men and women to conduct sexual relations within 
marriage rather than without.” Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 689–90 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). “This 
singular understanding of marriage has prevailed in the United States throughout our history. . . . 
To those who drafted and ratified the Constitution, this conception of marriage and family ‘was a 
given: its structure, its stability, roles, and values accepted by all.’” Id. at 690. 
 329.  
Choices about marriage shape an individual’s destiny. As the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts has explained, because “it fulfils yearnings for 
security, safe haven, and connection that express our common humanity, civil 
marriage is an esteemed institution, and the decision whether and whom to 
marry is among life’s momentous acts of self-definition.” 
Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 666 (quoting Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 955 
(Mass. 2003)). 
 330. During the same era, Congress passed Title X, but since 1980, the funding has been 
periodically under assault and unavailable to many groups, such as undocumented immigrants. 
See Naomi Cahn, Contraception Matters: Rights, Class, and Context, 24 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & 
SOC. JUST. 529, 537–39 (2018) (discussing class-based inequities in contraceptive access). 
 331. Id. at 549. 
 332. Id. at 550–51 (“A 2010 survey (pre-Affordable Care Act) found that more than one-third 
of female voters had struggled to afford prescription birth control at some point in their lives and, 
as a result, had used birth control inconsistently. At that point, birth control payments 
constituted approximately 30–44% total out-of-pocket expenses for health care.”). 
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simply—and appropriately—lets additional couples into marriage who have 
marshalled the resources on their own necessary to realize its aspirations.333 
While Obergefell thus recognizes the changed nature of marriage, it does 
not recognize how the marital ideal it articulates is beyond the reach of much 
of the population—and how the very nature of the ideal makes the uncoupling 
of marriage from societal benefits that much more critical. Fewer than 
two-thirds of American children live with married parents.334 Accordingly, 
children’s needs will not be met effectively by any attempt to: 1) condition 
important benefits on marriage; 2) use differential benefits to attempt to 
coerce parents into marriage;335 or 3) promote marriage as an end in itself. 
Existing efforts have shifted from marriage to work,336 but these too are 
inadequate, given the changing nature of work. The net effect of the failure 
to reconceive the terms of effective support has been to lock more children in 
persistent poverty.337 
C. Uncoupling Social Insurance from Employment 
The New Deal social insurance system, to the extent it provided greater 
family security, depended on the parallel interests of large employers in 
securing a stable workforce and the societal interest in encouraging greater 
family stability.338 In the information age, employers do not depend to the 
same degree on either large numbers of workers or long-term worker 
tenure.339 Yet, families still depend not just on employment but also on 
 
 333. See CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 238, at 128 (arguing that the change in the nature of 
marriage made recognition of marriage equality not only permissible but also a matter of basic 
fairness and equality). 
 334. The American Family Today, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Dec. 17, 2015), 
https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2015/12/17/1-the-american-family-today/ [https://perma.cc/
5RQK-JDLN]. 
 335. Indeed, more recent efforts have focused on removing the disincentives to marriage 
embedded in means-tested programs. See, e.g., W. BRADFORD WILCOX, JOSEPH P. PRICE & 
ANGELA RACHIDI, MARRIAGE, PENALIZED: DOES SOCIAL-WELFARE POLICY AFFECT FAMILY 
FORMATION? 29–31 (2016), https://ifstudies.org/ifs-admin/resources/marriage-penalty-hep-
2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/4KHC-DVCZ]. Even then, the studies conclude that program design 
has little impact on the incidence of marriage among the poorest recipients. Id. at 31. 
 336. This was the third objective of the TANF program. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 337. Hammond, supra note 290, at 1730. 
 338. Catherine A. Paul, President Roosevelt’s New Deal, VA. COMMONWEALTH UNIV. LIBRS. 
SOC. WELFARE HIST. PROJECT (2017), https://socialwelfare.library.vcu.edu/eras/great-
depression/the-new-deal/ [https://perma.cc/9K6D-E5JM]. 
 339. Changes in the American Workplace, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 6, 2016), 
https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2016/10/06/1-changes-in-the-american-workplace/ [https://
perma.cc/5VDC-J9M3]. 
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income stability to feel secure.340 Three changes, in particular, mean that 
employers are no longer appropriate partners for the provision of public 
benefits, requiring uncoupling social insurance from employment. 
First, and most significantly, as employment has become less secure, tying 
benefits to individual employers is no longer feasible. Full-time employment 
is less universal than it once was. In 1954, male labor market participation 
peaked at over 97%.341 It has steadily declined since, with employment 
becoming more steeply cyclical since the late seventies.342 Men with no more 
than a high school degree suffered the biggest drop, falling by 14%.343 
Women’s labor market participation rose during much of the period, but 
peaked in the late nineties and has declined since then.344 These figures reflect 
not just less employment but also less secure job tenure and longer periods 
between jobs.345 Employment is thus no longer sufficiently pervasive to 
anchor essential social benefits,346 and social insurance is not well designed 
to cover the gaps.347 
Second, as the nature of employment has changed, employer and 
employee interests do not align to the same degree.348 Today, corporate 
officers prioritize short-term shareholder interests at the expense of other 
stakeholders.349 As part of this shift, they have transferred risk to the 
 
 340. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 299, at 297–99 (describing how financial instability traps 
families in property). 
 341. EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, THE 
LONG-TERM DECLINE IN PRIME-AGE MALE LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION 2 (2016), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/20160620_cea_primeage_m
ale_lfp.pdf [https://perma.cc/U8PY-RUNV]. 
 342. See, e.g., Ruggles, supra note 51, at 1817 fig.16 (showing that the percentage of adult 
males engaged in wage labor peaked in 1970 and has steadily declined down to levels last seen 
in 1860, when a high percentage of the male population still lived on farms). Ruggles also shows 
that female labor force participation now roughly equals male participation and is expected to 
exceed it in the years ahead. Id. 
 343. EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., supra note 341, at 13. 
 344. Elisabeth Jacobs & Kate Bahn, Women’s History Month: U.S. Women’s Labor Force 
Participation, WASH. CTR. FOR EQUITABLE GROWTH (Mar. 22, 2019), 
https://equitablegrowth.org/womens-history-month-u-s-womens-labor-force-participation/ 
[https://perma.cc/S9RT-MKR8]. 
 345. Bunker, supra note 23. 
 346. Id. (showing that male employment has declined significantly after each recession over 
the last half century and that employment in each case never returned to its prerecession rates, 
with the downturns becoming more severe after the late seventies). 
 347. See, e.g., Pendo, supra note 21 (discussing high rates of rejection for those with 
pre-existing conditions, which are much more of a problem with frequent job changes). 
 348. Carbone & Levit, supra note 225, at 1026–29; DAVIS, supra note 17, at 124–26. 
 349. See, e.g., Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate 
Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 265, 296–97, 304 (2012) (describing emphasis on short-term earnings 
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employees.350 This means that social insurance, in turn, needs to address the 
systemic risks that were once factored into the protections large employers 
offered.351 
Finally, the information economy produces more “good jobs” with full 
benefits for high-value employees and more “bad jobs” with lower wages and 
few benefits for the unskilled.352 This means that employer-provided plans 
leave out a high percentage of the labor force. For example, in 2009, roughly 
half the workforce lacked employer-based retirement plans.353 And declining 
rates of employer-provided insurance coverage was an important motive for 
adoption of the ACA.354 Compounding the problem, particularly in the case 
of health insurance, is the fact that tax-subsidized coverage for some 
increases the prices for the uninsured.355 As a result, employer-provided plans 
have become regressive in effect; taxpayers subsidize the better off in ways 
that make those without employer benefits worse off in relative and 
sometimes absolute terms.356 
Complementing these developments, the Supreme Court sees corporations 
as no more than instruments to advance their owners’ aims and unions as no 
more than private actors whose societal role does not merit protection. Both 
developments suggest that corporations are no longer appropriate partners for 
the societal interest in promoting family security and stability, and that, 
instead, individuals are the appropriate focus. 
 
that boost share price at the expense of other corporate interests); Dorothy S. Lund, The Case 
Against Passive Shareholder Voting, 43 J. CORP. L. 493, 520–23 (2018); Lynn A. Stout, 
Response, The Toxic Side Effects of Shareholder Primacy, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 2003, 2014 (2013); 
Jeff Schwartz, De Facto Shareholder Primacy, 79 MD. L. REV. 652, 665, 681 (2020) (indicating 
that companies often increase share price at the expense of employees). And Delaware has made 
it possible to waive even those obligations. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-1101 to -1110 (2021). 
 350. See, e.g., JACOB S. HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT 13–14 (2008) (describing increased 
financial risks including job loss, difficulty in securing health insurance, and less secure pension 
rights). 
 351. See DAVIS, supra note 17, at 122–24 (describing decline in the number of employees at 
large corporations and the greater transience in the labor market more generally). 
 352. See KALLEBERG, supra note 249, at 12–18 (arguing that the information economy tends 
to produce more good jobs and bad jobs, hollowing out the center). 
 353. Maureen Minehan, Obama Budget Could Increase Employer Obligations, 26 EMP. 
ALERT 1, 1 (2009). 
 354. See, e.g., Pendo, supra note 21, at 474 (“[T]he erosion of employer-sponsored coverage 
has increased the ranks of the uninsured.”). 
 355. Graetz & Mashaw, supra note 123, at 354 (observing that “[t]he tax subsidies for 
employment-based health insurance and retirement income [have become] the federal 
government’s largest ‘tax expenditures’”). 
 356. See, e.g., id. at 350–51 (describing intrinsic failings of private health insurance markets). 
53:001] UNCOUPLING 51 
 
The Supreme Court’s hostility to labor unions has been compared to the 
Court’s actions during the Lochner era.357 The current Court’s conservative 
majority has rejected the very idea of collective action to promote a civic 
society ideal.358 Thus, in Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, the Court held that 
the First Amendment forbids public-sector unions from collecting mandatory 
union fees from nonmember employees,359 threatening the financial base of 
these unions.360 The Court privileged the right of an individual employee to 
avoid paying dues over the union role in advancing workers’ collective 
interests.361 
The Supreme Court, at the same time, has adopted a view of corporations 
as agents of their owners, with no need to take other considerations, such as 
employee interests, into account. In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, a closely 
held, for-profit corporation refused to provide federally mandated health care 
benefits to its employees because the benefits covered the morning after 
pill,362 which the company claimed, inaccurately, acted as an abortifacient.363 
In ruling for the corporation, the Court observed that owners who act through 
such corporations do not surrender the rights they might otherwise have.364 
 
 357. See, e.g., Kate Andrias, Janus’s Two Faces, 2018 SUP. CT. REV. 21, 30 (describing 
criticism that “the Roberts Court has used the First Amendment much as the Lochner Court did 
the Due Process Clause—to thwart democratically chosen outcomes and, more specifically, to 
protect the privileges of the economically powerful while resisting legislative and executive 
efforts to advance the interests of the less powerful”). 
 358. Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court’s Challenge to Civil Society, 2019 SUP. CT. REV. 
335, 336 (“[I]n fostering a constitutional culture that entitles individuals to opt out of duties they 
find disagreeable, the court is eroding the expectation of collective obligation that civil society 
requires if it is to thrive.”). 
 359. See Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2459–60 (2018). 
 360. Id. at 2490 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (recognizing that “basic economic theory shows why 
a government would think that agency fees are necessary for exclusive representation to work,” 
given legislative requirements mandate union representation of all employees, whether members 
or not, and classic free-rider problems); see also Bill Blum, Opinion, Recent Rulings Expose 
Supreme Court’s Anti-Worker Bias, TRUTHDIG (Aug. 8, 2018), 
https://www.truthdig.com/articles/recent-rulings-expose-the-supreme-courts-anti-worker-bias/ 
[https://perma.cc/4PKG-XTUX] (claiming that Janus poses an existential threat to union 
survival). 
 361. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2474 (contending that it is impossible to argue that the extent of 
state spending for employee benefits is not a matter of a great public concern and therefore that 
public employees should not have to pay union fees to advance positions with which they may 
not agree); see also Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1616, 1626 (2018) (upholding 
employers actions requiring employees to sign, as a condition of employment, arbitration 
agreements banning collective judicial and arbitral proceedings of any kind, which had the effect 
of prohibiting union actions to address wages and hour violations on behalf of the employees). 
 362. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 688–91 (2014). 
 363. See Rachel Frank, Miss-Conceptions: Abortifacients, Regulatory Failure, and Political 
Opportunity, 129 YALE L.J. 208, 211–24 (2019). 
 364. Burwell, 573 U.S. at 706–07. 
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As a result, Hobby Lobby’s owners had a constitutional right to 
simultaneously benefit from publicly subsidized health insurance benefits 
while picking and choosing the benefits it offered based on the owners’ 
particular religious views. The ability to receive public benefits no longer 
comes with a duty to advance the public good.365 
The Court’s subsequent opinion in Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter 
& Paul Home v. Pennsylvania extended the principle.366 The Little Sisters 
operate nursing homes for the elderly poor.367 In accordance with Catholic 
teachings, the Little Sisters took the view “that deliberately avoiding 
reproduction through medical means is immoral.”368 The original HHS 
regulations provided that religious employers could be exempted from the 
mandate to cover contraception if they filed certain paperwork “self-
certifying” their objections.369 The Little Sisters, however, objected that “the 
self-certification accommodation renders them ‘complicit in providing 
[contraceptive] coverage to which they sincerely object.’”370 The Trump 
administration issued new regulations broadly extending the ability of 
businesses to opt out of government provisions.371 
The Court upheld the regulations on a 7-2 vote,372 finding that the 
regulations allowing for exemptions from the contraceptive mandate based 
on “‘sincerely held’ moral and religious objections” were valid.373 Indeed, 
employers may be entitled to the exemption without consideration of the 
 
 365. Carbone & Levit, supra note 225, at 1016–26; see also Greenhouse, supra note 358, at 
347–54. 
 366. Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367 
(2020). 
 367. Id. at 2375. 
 368. Id. at 2376. 
 369. Id. at 2370. 
 370. Id. at 2403 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (alteration in original). 
 371. Religious Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventative 
Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 45 C.F.R. § 147.132 (2018). For a more detailed 
discussion of potential government responses to these cases, see Douglas NeJaime and Reva B. 
Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 
YALE L.J. 2516 (2015). 
 372. Justices Breyer and Kagan, who had dissented in Hobby Lobby, upheld the Trump 
regulations on administrative law grounds. Little Sisters, 140 S. Ct. at 2396–401 (Kagan, J., 
concurring). 
 373. Id. at 2386 (majority opinion); see Greenhouse, supra note 358, at 352 (“Judge Wendy 
Beetlestone, in granting a preliminary injunction . . . marveled at the new rule’s ‘remarkable 
breadth’ and asked: ‘Who determines whether the expressed moral reason is sincere or not or, for 
that matter, whether it falls within the bounds of morality or is merely a preference choice?’ The 
administration, she observed, ‘has conjured up a world where a government entity is empowered 
to impose its own version of morality on each one of us. . . . That cannot be right.’” (first alteration 
added)). 
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impact on the affected group (in this case women who would like access to 
basic means of contraception such as the birth control pill).374 
Justice Alito’s opinion for the majority in Hobby Lobby and his concurring 
opinion in Little Sisters emphasize the government’s potential ability to 
deliver contraceptive access in other ways.375 His logic follows from his 
embrace of the unlimited nature of corporate rights. The obvious corollary to 
the conclusion that corporate owners have no societal obligations when they 
enter the public square is that they are unsuitable partners for advancing 
public ends. The obvious response, as Justice Alito suggests, is direct 
government provision of health insurance benefits. With employment no 
longer providing security, and unions no longer serving as a countervailing 
force that systematizes employer benefits, corporations are no longer 
appropriate partners for the state in assuring family security. 
IV. UNCOUPLING REALIZED: RECONSTRUCTING FAMILY SECURITY AND 
STABILITY 
As corporations change, this has implications for designing a system of 
family security. Ronald Coase, in his classic article, The Nature of the Firm, 
observed in the 1930s that the hallmark of the industrial age was the rise of 
large institutions and what Katherine Stone calls “internal labor markets,”376 
and that these features characterized both socialist and capitalist 
institutions.377 Today’s firms have reversed that process, preferring networks 
that rely on external markets (e.g., temp agencies, independent contractors) 
 
 374. While Justice Alito insisted in Hobby Lobby that the ruling would not cost women 
anything, the Trump administration, in its petition for certiorari in Little Sisters, took the position 
that the contested regulations should be upheld even if they did burden women, asserting that 
“any loss of contraceptive coverage to women whose private employers invoke the religious 
exemption would result from decisions of those employers, not the government.” Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari at 26, Trump v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 918 (No. 19-454) sub nom. Little Sisters, 
140 S. Ct. 2367 (2020); see also Greenhouse, supra note 358, at 352. 
 375. Little Sisters, 140 S. Ct. at 2393 (Alito, J., concurring) (suggesting that the Government 
could send out “a special card that could be presented at a pharmacy to fill a prescription for 
contraceptives without any out-of-pocket expense” or inform employees of the ability to obtain 
free contraceptives “by going to a conveniently located government clinic”); Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 765 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (referring to Alito’s 
insistence that the government could itself “assume the cost of providing” the contraceptives or 
could replicate the accommodation provided for religiously affiliated nonprofit organizations); 
see NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 371, at 2532 (noting difficulties with the proposal). 
 376. That is, employers who hire almost exclusively at the entry level and promote from 
within. See Stone, supra note 116, at 460; see also Carbone & Levit, supra note 225, at 972–74 
(explaining significance of Coase’s insights). 
 377. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 389–90 (1937) (observing 
that the rise of large institutions characterizes both capitalist and socialist economies). 
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to create more flexible commercial entities.378 The family ideal of the modern 
age has changed, in turn, to complement the network-like business 
organization.379 Within this system, commitment to children, rather than 
marriage, becomes the indispensable moral command.380 Security comes 
from capital (human and financial) investments that pay off in terms of 
savings, employability, and adult relationships built on flexibility, trust, and 
mutual respect.381 
A. Reconstructing Through Uncoupling 
The missing piece in this reconstruction of the sources of family stability 
and security is the redesign of the state role necessary to fill in the gaps of the 
new economic order and make its benefits more universally available. The 
challenge is how to secure the human capital investment in “employability” 
necessary for full participation in the new economy.382 Given that neither 
work nor marriage nor the combination of the two necessarily produces 
stability in the new order, the question is how to provide the minimum terms 
of a social safety net (food, clothing, housing, health care, and education) that 
remakes the basis for family security. Designing such a system—and 
redesigning the state to implement it—would require volumes. The fight over 
implementation of the ACA illustrates the terms on which the fight for the 
new system is likely to be waged.383 
Health insurance access was originally built on the family wage model.384 
Congress structured Medicare to complement the Social Security retirement 
program, using a dedicated payroll tax to fund at least part of the program. 
Medicaid was initially enacted 
to furnish (1) medical assistance on behalf of families with 
dependent children and of aged, blind, or disabled individuals, 
whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of 
 
 378. Stone, supra note 205, at 155 (describing shift to more flexible and network-like 
corporate structures). 
 379. CARBONE, supra note 137, at 104. 
 380. Id. at xiii (describing how the courts are rebuilding family law based on the principle of 
obligation to children). 
 381. See CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 110, at 117–18 (describing how changed marital 
scripts reflect women’s greater equality). 
 382. See supra Part II.C. 
 383. See Abbe R. Gluck, Mark Regan & Erica Turret, The Affordable Care Act’s Litigation 
Decade, 108 GEO. L.J. 1471, 1474 (2020) (noting “[t]he ACA retains the mixed system of federal, 
state, and private healthcare that came before it, but seeks to make the system more generous and 
accessible,” and ongoing litigation over it has moved the nation towards more universal access). 
 384. See supra Part I.C. 
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necessary medical services, and (2) rehabilitation and other services 
to help such families and individuals attain or retain capability for 
independence or self-care.385 
That is, both plans were designed to fill in the gaps of the family wage system. 
By the time President Obama proposed the ACA in 2009, however, 
increasing numbers of working Americans could no longer obtain health 
insurance from their employers, and the cost of private insurance was rising 
so rapidly that scholars feared a “death spiral” undermining the system.386 
Over time, however, the principle underlying the ACA has become the 
right of access to health care itself.387 In January 2020, a majority of the 
country (56%) favored a national Medicare-for-all health plan and two-thirds 
of the public (68%) supported a government-administered “public option.”388 
A larger government role has become more palatable, and the principle of 
universal access has become even more widely accepted.389 
The litigation over the ACA has been long and complicated, but the Act 
has been easiest to defend where its principles have been articulated most 
unequivocally and where its benefits have been most universally available.390 
 
 385. Gresham v. Azar, 950 F.3d 93, 99 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Arkansas v. 
Gresham, No. 20-38, 2020 WL 7086047 (U.S. Dec. 4, 2020). 
 386. Elizabeth A. Pendo, Book Review, 29 J. LEGAL MED. 117, 118 (2008) (reviewing SUSAN 
STARR SERED & RUSHIKA FERNANDOPULLE, UNINSURED IN AMERICA: LIFE AND DEATH IN THE 
LAND OF OPPORTUNITY (2007)) (“The death spiral is a term used to describe the process by which 
a pool of people covered by an insurance plan loses its relatively healthy members, causing costs 
to increase for the remaining members. Unchecked, the spiral continues until the insurance plan 
can no longer be sustained and ultimately ‘dies.’”). 
 387. After he left office, Obama observed, “We fought to make sure that in America, health 
care is not just a privilege, but a right for every single American.” President Barack Obama, 
Remarks by the President on the Affordable Care Act (Oct. 20, 2016), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/10/20/remarks-president-afford
able-care-act [https://perma.cc/L98K-BG8T]. 
 388. Lunna Lopes, Liz Hamel, Audrey Kearney & Mollyann Brodie, KFF Health Tracking 
Poll–January 2020: Medicare-for-All, Public Option, Health Care Legislation and Court 
Actions, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/poll-
finding/kff-health-tracking-poll-january-2020/ [https://perma.cc/F5AD-C2MC]. In addition, the 
public supported the ACA by a margin of 53% to 37%, a considerably higher ratio than during 
the Obama Presidency. Id. 
 389. See, e.g., Gluck et al., supra note 383, at 1474 (observing that while the ACA originated 
as a compromise incorporating market norms, “it has emerged from a decade of litigation much 
more closely aligned with the norms of solidarity and universal coverage than it was in 2010”). 
 390. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 544 (2012) (upholding the Act 
as within congressional taxing power). Congress, however, later abolished the individual 
mandate, and new cases are pending challenging the ACA on the ground that it is no longer a tax 
and therefore no longer authorized by the taxing power. See Texas v. United States, 945 F.3d 355, 
369 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. granted sub nom. California v. Texas, 140 S. Ct. 1262 (Mar. 2, 2020) 
(No. 19-840), and cert. granted sub nom. Texas v. California, 140 S. Ct. 1262 (Mar. 2, 2020) (No. 
19-1019). 
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Implementation of the ACA depends on state-run insurance markets that 
allow individuals to purchase policies from private insurers at subsidized 
prices, expanded employer coverage, and state-administered Medicaid 
expansion.391 Each element of the program has different requirements, and 
each has been subjected to extended attack.392 On the other hand, more direct 
federal provisions of health care benefits, such as Medicare-for-all or a public 
option, might well be harder to challenge, legally and politically.393 
Cesar Ardon’s situation is an example of how the norm of universal access 
to health care, now identified with the ACA, departs significantly from the 
older system that tied benefits to the family wage regime.394 The Secretary of 
HHS, in approving the Arkansas work requirements that threatened Ardon’s 
eligibility, observed that they would “encourage beneficiaries to obtain and 
maintain employment or undertake other community engagement activities 
that research has shown to be correlated with improved health and 
wellness.”395 While being employed may be correlated with better health 
outcomes, taking away health insurance for failing to find work is a different 
matter.396 The D.C. Circuit, in striking down the requirements, held that: “The 
text of the statute includes one primary purpose, which is providing health 
care coverage without any restriction geared to healthy outcomes, financial 
independence or transition to commercial coverage.”397 
In justifying its approval of exceptions to the program in Arkansas, 
Kentucky, and elsewhere, the Trump administration argued that the threat of 
sanctions was necessary to force people to work.398 Yet, the D.C. Circuit 
emphasized that such reasoning failed to take into account the loss of 
coverage—“a matter of importance under the statute.”399 The court record 
showed that “in Arkansas, more than 18,000 people (about 25% of those 
 
 391. Gluck et al., supra note 383, at 1475–76. 
 392. Id. at 1477–91 (summarizing the challenges). 
 393. Id. at 1492 (“It would be an ironic legacy for a law that began as a market-oriented 
compromise, and then was challenged as government overreach, to pave the way toward 
nationalization.”). 
 394. See supra notes 1–11 and accompanying text. 
 395. Gresham v. Azar, 950 F.3d 93, 97 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Arkansas v. 
Gresham, No. 20-38, 2020 WL 7086047 (U.S. Dec. 4, 2020); see Hammond, supra note 13. 
 396. HANNAH KATCH, JENNIFER WAGNER & AVIVA ARON-DINE, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y 
PRIORITIES, TAKING MEDICAID COVERAGE AWAY FROM PEOPLE NOT MEETING WORK 
REQUIREMENTS WILL REDUCE LOW-INCOME FAMILIES’ ACCESS TO CARE AND WORSEN HEALTH 
OUTCOMES 16 (2018), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/2-8-18health2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KTF9-QLK3]. 
 397. Gresham, 950 F.3d at 102; see Gluck & Scott-Railton, supra note 13, at 530, 557 
(characterizing the decision as a rejection of a “normative or moral retrenchment based on a new 
narrative of deservingness”). 
 398. Gresham, 950 F.3d at 97. 
 399. Id. at 102. 
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subject to the work requirement) lost coverage as a result of the project in just 
five months.”400 Research on work requirements in other programs generally 
finds that they neither reduce poverty nor increase long-term employment.401 
Indeed, the causation may run in the opposite direction, with access to health 
care positively related to an individual’s ability to work.402 If Ardon has no 
access to health care, he is also unlikely to be able to work.403 Of course, the 
critical point in the court’s opinion in rejecting the tie between work and 
benefits is the concept of access to health care, and in that, the D.C. Circuit, 
perhaps ironically, echoes Justice Alito’s opinion in Little Sisters by rejecting 
the tie-in between work and benefits.404 
Gresham involved a matter of statutory construction.405 Yet, the critical 
issue in the lawsuit requires the willingness to interpret the ACA in terms of 
a congressional intent to see access to health care as a matter of right that 
serves as a precondition for employability rather than as a reward for 
employment.406 At a time when secure jobs are hard to come by and many 
cannot afford gap measures such as COBRA, the design of the ACA 
embraced the principle of universal access.407 The D.C. Circuit decision 
clearly interpreted the Act in such terms.408 The challenge now lies with the 
Supreme Court’s willingness to accept the clear statement of congressional 
intent. 
B. Objections to Uncoupling 
Of course, uncoupling is not uncomplicated, and it raises pragmatic issues 
of affordability and political feasibility. It also leads to more theoretical 
questions of why government should bear the burdens.409 
 
 400. Id. at 102–03. 
 401. KATCH ET AL., supra note 396, at 16. 
 402. Larisa Antonisse & Rachel Garfield, The Relationship Between Work and Health: 
Findings from a Literature Review, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Aug. 7, 
2018), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/the-relationship-between-work-and-health-find
ings-from-a-literature-review/ [https://perma.cc/SK6G-58T2]. 
 403. See supra notes 1–11 and accompanying text. 
 404. Gresham, 950 F.3d at 101–02. 
 405. See id. at 99–102. 
 406. Id. at 101–02. 
 407. Gluck et al., supra note 383, at 1492. 
 408. Gresham, 950 F.3d at 102. 
 409. See generally Jedediah Britton-Purdy, David Singh Grewal, Amy Kapczynski & K. 
Sabeel Rahman, Building a Law-and-Political-Economy Framework: Beyond the 
Twentieth-Century Synthesis, 129 YALE L.J. 1784 (2020) (articulating the need for such a new 
vision in legal scholarship). 
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One objection is that, as articulated by the Obergefell dissent, marriage 
remains a positive good that the state should promote for the benefit of 
children.410 Our response is, first, that the causality runs in the other direction; 
it is the decline in security that undermines marriage, not the lack of marriage 
that undermines family security.411 Second, as the Supreme Court emphasized 
in the seventies, conditioning benefits on marriage, when marriage is beyond 
the reach of much of the population, is pointless and cruel.412 That proverbial 
ship has sailed. 
A second objection, that work ensures productive citizens and provides 
dignity and social meaning, is more difficult. That concept is the basis for 
incentivizing labor market participation in TANF and other programs through 
punitive means.413 Others propose rebuilding security and stability through 
redesigning work. The Earned Income Tax Credit,414 which has the effect of 
subsidizing low-income employment, is an example of this approach.415 Uber 
CEO Dara Khosrowshahi has called for the redesign of benefits to require 
employer contributions to create a fund workers could use for the benefits 
of their choice.416 These work-centered approaches suffer, however, from 
three principal limitations. First, they would have to ensure that 
employment is universally available at a time when automation is 
 
 410. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 689 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 411. See discussion supra Part II; see also Douglas S. Massey & Robert J. Sampson, 
Introduction: Moynihan Redux: Legacies and Lessons, 621 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 
6, 13 (2009) (observing that the debate over family change that started with the Moynihan Report 
in the sixties involves the premise that “whenever males in any population subgroup lack 
widespread access to reliable jobs, decent earnings, and key forms of socially rewarded status, 
single parenthood will increase, with negative side effects on women and children”). 
 412. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 413. Perhaps the most remarkable insistence on cutting assistance in order to encourage 
employment came from Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin, who has insisted that Congress 
should cut unemployment benefits by two-thirds during the COVID-19 pandemic because 
otherwise recipients will not have an incentive to return to work. Mary Papenfuss, Study 
Contradicts Steven Mnuchin Claim that Lazy Workers Choose Unemployment over Jobs, 
HUFFPOST (Aug. 3, 2020, 7:46 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/mnuchin-unemployment-
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 414. Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-Based 
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reducing market demand for unskilled labor.417 Second, the redesign would 
have to cover not just getting the first job, but also the ability to switch to a 
new job.418 Third, if the program is invisible, Congress can abolish it. Social 
Security is untouchable because older people identify so strongly with it. 
This raises a final objection: cost. Medicaid is expensive, and the ACA’s 
expansion of Medicaid increased costs by about 14%.419 The existing 
American health care system, however, which is the most expensive in the 
world, does not deliver health care benefits commensurate with its costs.420 
Changing the system so that money is spent more efficiently would not 
necessarily increase costs.421 
Still, reestablishing a comprehensive system of family security and 
stability requires reconsideration of political support for government 
spending.422 The ACA, for example, has proven to be surprisingly resilient, 
generating not just support for the ACA itself, but also for the principle of 
universal coverage.423 
On the jurisprudential question of whether uncoupling calls for a new 
relationship between individual and state rather than trying to recreate the 
prior marriage–work–benefits partnership, the short answer is that there is no 
other real choice. Marriage is no longer universal; employment is no longer 
universal. Work-based solutions work only when they can reset labor 
markets, which requires the kind of active state role that existed in the era 
following World War II. Moreover, as the new political economy movement 
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in the law suggests, calling attention to issues of power and distribution 
provides a critical step in seeing legal developments as the product of political 
forces, not as the neutral or inevitable response to market forces.424 
CONCLUSION 
This Article focuses attention on how the legal structures supporting 
family security have become decoupled from marriage and employment. 
Understanding the ways in which the family wage system developed from 
the structure of industrial-era employment leads to the conclusion that the 
information age will inevitably require a new model to deliver a basic level 
of family security.425 Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized 
that corporations no longer need to take responsibility for their employees 
and that the meaning of marriage has changed. It has even provided a few 
signposts for how, in the absence of long-term employment or stable 
relationships, individual security might still be protected. 
The dominant political view over the last several decades has nonetheless 
been a neoliberal one, in which the state’s primary goal has been to support 
the “free market[ ], rather than regulating to promote public goods” like 
economic or social justice.426 This neoliberal philosophy is similar to the 
laissez-faire beliefs that generated wholesale opposition to labor market 
regulation during the Lochner era.427 It has similarly inspired entrenched 
opposition today to the ACA’s premise that the government should ensure 
universal access to health care.428 Within this view, Cesar Ardon’s first 
priority ought to be his own financial independence, with the loss of health 
care benefits as the penalty for his inability to do so.429 In this story, 
individuals are responsible for their own well-being, and employment and 
marriage are treated as the universally available private mechanisms for 
securing family stability.430 
 
 424. See Britton-Purdy et al., supra note 409, at 1784 (calling for legal scholarship to center 
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v. United States, supra note 390. 
 429. See supra note 413 and accompanying text. 
 430. See supra note 413 and accompanying text. 
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An alternative vision maintains that family security and stability come 
from a societal design that complements the principal form of economic 
organization and that addresses the inevitable instability that arises from the 
economic system itself.431 This view has historical resonance, as this Article 
shows: once wage labor replaced farm ownership as the primary source of 
family support, a larger government role became the only way to maintain a 
comparable level of family stability.432 This vision, in which the state has an 
obligation to ensure family security and stability, builds on Justice Alito’s 
prescription for how to provide medical insurance that covers contraception; 
in a world in which employers enjoy much greater freedom to design 
employment to meet their individual ends,433 only direct government 
provision to individual employees can give them the same flexibility.434 
Redesigning an alternative system of family security without either 
marriage or long-term employment as a starting premise, however, will 
require more than simply providing universal access to health care. Three 
basic models already exist for the reconstruction of the citizen–state 
relationship.435 The first is based on an unconditional cash grant.436 In 
building on the jurisprudence of legal and economic scholars, former 
Presidential candidate Andrew Yang termed it a “Freedom Dividend,” similar 
to earlier proposals for a universal basic income.437 It would be uncoupled 
from both marriage and employment but structured in a way likely to generate 
more jobs and more stable relationships.438 
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The second is modern monetary theory’s proposal for a job guarantee.439 
The job guarantee would create a public employment program that would 
ensure a job with a minimum wage and benefit package to anyone who 
wanted to work.440 The job guarantee is part of a macroeconomic policy 
framework designed to produce full employment and offset the private 
business cycle’s impact on unemployment.441 The program would be 
designed both to ensure that low-skill individuals could find employment and 
to contribute to public infrastructure including care work.442 
The third, binary economics, is designed to give each adult a capital stake 
in the U.S. economy.443 The theory rests on the idea that capital ownership, 
such as holding shares in corporations, should be more broadly dispersed,444 
and that the capital owners should therefore be able to share in the returns to 
capital.445 
Each proposal involves the redesign of a system of family security and 
stability uncoupled from marriage and employment. With the Supreme 
Court’s redefinition of marriage in terms of individual self-expression, the 
severing of the civic obligations of corporate owners, and the undermining of 
the federal–state–private compacts that once secured individual benefits, an 
alternative system must grapple with just what form uncoupling should take 
to respond to the challenges of contemporary inequality. 
Ultimately, the more basic issue involves the terms on which the 
government can extend a basic right to security and stability to all Americans, 
that is, how to design a new state-administered regime that complements the 
information age by uncoupling family security and stability from marriage 
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and from employment.446 By limiting family security to those “deserving” of 
it, whether based on marriage or work, the existing system is premised on 
outmoded and exclusionary assumptions about the appropriate relationship 
between individual and state. As a legal, social, and cultural matter, family 
security and stability are important, but, with the dynamic and systemic 
dismantling of the old system that tied that stability to employment and to 
marriage, only a new system can address these issues. In exploring how the 
relationship between individual and state might be reconceptualized, this 
Article offers guidance on the first jurisprudential steps towards a redesign of 
the state–citizen compact. 
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